Just published.
The newest CVEs, straight from CVE.org and NVD.
-
CVE-2026-92744
Under certain conditions, privilege manager agent allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code as LocalSystem.
-
CVE-2026-119317
On Linux, an authenticated, low-privileged Nessus user with scan-creation rights could read arbitrary text files on the scanner host with the privileges of the nessusd process by running a custom Unix compliance audit against the scanner itself.
-
CVE-2026-51831
An issue in IDrive IDrive Backup for Windows Version 7.0.1.1 and below affected, remediated in Version 7.0.1.2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the id_service.exe component
-
CVE-2026-51832
An issue in IDrive IDrive Backup for Windows Version 7.0.1.1 and below affected, remediated in Version 7.0.1.2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the id_service.exe component
-
CVE-2026-119193
PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. From 13.4.0 until 13.4.4, the TestCase::coverageFilesDirectory() logic in src/Runner/Phpt/TestCase.php creates temporary files for PHPT code coverage in a predictable phpunit-phpt directory under sys_get_temp_dir() and reuses that directory without verifying its ownership or permissions. On multi-user systems with a shared temporary path, a local attacker who creates the directory before the developer runs PHPT tests with code coverage can replace the generated job file before the child process executes it with require, allowing arbitrary code execution with the developer's privileges while the test and coverage report appear successful. PHPUnit 12.5 and earlier, default macOS and Windows configurations with per-user temporary directories, and single-user environments where another user cannot create files in the temporary path are not affected. This issue is fixed in 13.4.4.
-
CVE-2026-119251
A malicious actor with local access and high privileges could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in WiFiman Desktop for macOS to escalate privileges on the host device.
-
CVE-2026-115805
Improper handling of local filesystem paths in Rapid7 Insight Agent on Linux and macOS may allow authenticated local users to gain elevated privileges. Exploitation requires existing local access and depends on the Agent's inventory collection processing the crafted path.
-
CVE-2026-119025
open 7.2.0 before 11.0.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability that allows attackers to execute PowerShell code by supplying crafted URLs on Windows and WSL. Attackers can embed $(...) subexpressions in URLs, such as OAuth authorization_endpoint values from malicious MCP servers, which execute when index.js passes them unescaped to powershell -EncodedCommand.
-
CVE-2026-103665
The installer for Yamaha LAN Monitor for Windows provided by Yamaha Corporation may insecurely load Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs). When the installer is launched in a directory containing a specially crafted DLL file, the malicious DLL may be loaded, resulting in arbitrary code execution with administrative privileges.
-
CVE-2026-88941
Kaspersky has fixed a vulnerability in the Network Agent for Windows module of Kaspersky Security Center. The vulnerability could potentially cause the Network Agent module of Kaspersky Security Center to malfunction. There are no evidence of the vulnerability exploitation in-the-wild.
-
CVE-2026-118688
wasmtime-wasi in Wasmtime before 36.0.18, 37.0.0 before 48.0.6, and 49.0.0 before 49.0.3 re-appends a trailing slash to rename source paths, causing renameat on macOS and FreeBSD hosts to follow directory symlinks. A guest with sandbox write access can rename a relative symlink such as "up/" to move host directories into its sandbox and read or write them.
-
CVE-2026-118680
SiYuan 3.8.7 through 3.8.8 fails to normalize Windows GLOBALROOT device-namespace aliases, bypassing the IsSensitivePath denylist. Attackers can invoke importStdMd with a GLOBALROOT-prefixed path to copy the API token and TLS private key into the publicly served assets directory.
-
CVE-2026-82961
The GPIO syscall handlers in drivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c did not validate the pin argument supplied by a user-mode caller. z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure(), z_vrfy_gpio_pin_get_config() and z_vrfy_gpio_pin_interrupt_configure() verified only the device object (K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_GPIO() / K_SYSCALL_OBJ()) and then passed the caller-supplied gpio_pin_t straight through to z_impl_gpio_pin_*() and on to the driver. The only pin check in include/zephyr/drivers/gpio.h was __ASSERT(gpio_port_pin_is_supported(cfg->port_pin_mask, pin), ...), which compiles to nothing unless CONFIG_ASSERT is enabled, so in a production build no check existed at all. GPIO drivers use pin as a shift count and as an array index on the documented assumption that it is a pin the controller supports. On STM32, for example, gpio_stm32_pin_interrupt_configure() turns pin into an EXTI line and stm32_gpio_intc_set_irq_callback() writes data->cb[line_num].cb and data->cb[line_num].data into a NUM_EXTI_LINES-entry array (default 16) in drivers/interrupt_controller/intc_gpio_stm32.c, guarded only by a compiled-out __ASSERT_NO_MSG(); the same function then reads exti_irq_table[line_num] and calls irq_enable() on the result. Other controllers index fixed-size per-pin configuration tables the same way — drivers/gpio/gpio_ite_it8xxx2_v2.c reads an MMIO base pointer out of wuc_base[8] with the caller's pin and performs a read-modify-write through it. The issue is reachable only in builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y (the file is compiled under that symbol), by a user-mode thread that has been granted access to a GPIO device object. Such a grant is intended to authorize control of that port's pins; the missing validation instead lets the thread drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of a function pointer and an associated void * past a kernel .bss array, and out-of-bounds reads that feed irq_enable() and MMIO accesses — an escape from the user-mode sandbox that can lead to kernel memory corruption, arbitrary code execution, or a crash. The fix validates pin against the controller's gpio_driver_config.port_pin_mask with gpio_port_pin_is_supported() in every pin-taking z_vrfy_ handler and returns -EINVAL otherwise, complemented by an unconditional pin >= GPIO_MAX_PINS_PER_PORT range check added to the shared z_impl_gpio_pin_*() inlines.
-
CVE-2026-118602
Alpine iLX-F511 Fiv.System Exposed Dangerous Method Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Alpine iLX-F511. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the Fiv service. The issue results from an exposed dangerous method. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-29095.
-
CVE-2026-118581
A BSON encoding component of the MongoDB Java Driver does not verify that an externally supplied raw document's self-declared length agrees with the extent of the byte range it is given before that range is copied into an outgoing database command. An application that wraps untrusted raw bytes in such a document and uses it as part of a command can therefore emit a structurally inconsistent message, causing the database to interpret attacker-supplied trailing content as additional fields of the surrounding command. No authentication to the driver or database is required beyond the ability to influence those bytes through the victim application, and no user interaction is needed. The result is unintended modification of the command actually executed, which can alter the data read or written under the application's credentials.
-
CVE-2026-81472
Dell iDRAC Service Module (iSM) for Windows, Dell iDRAC Service Module (iSM) for Linux, and Dell iDRAC Service Module (iSM) for ESXi, versions prior to 6.1.1.0, contains an Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of privileges.
-
CVE-2026-99215
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: core: prevent unregistering a power supply while a callback runs Once a power supply is registered, its callbacks can immediately start firing from other contexts, such as external_power_changed() triggered by the TCPM stack. If a power supply is unregistered while the callback is still running, the driver data can already be freed when the callback tries to access it, leading to a use-after-free. This happens e.g. when the hardware bus carrying the power supply device malfunctions (e.g. I2C is hogged down by another malfunctioning device) immediately after the power supply is registered, and thus the core is still processing the callbacks which were queued up when the driver starts the removal, leading in some cases to a kernel crash, e.g.: [ 11.645942] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000005 [ 11.646751] Mem abort info: [ 11.647006] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 11.647338] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 11.647806] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 11.648077] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 11.648356] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 11.648785] Data abort info: [ 11.649041] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 11.649524] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 11.649981] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0 [ 11.650390] [0000000000000005] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 11.650955] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 11.651460] Modules linked in: [ 11.651742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 144 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc6-g62a9297af2cd #1 PREEMPT [ 11.652553] Hardware name: Flipper One rev. F0B1C2 (DT) [ 11.653024] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work [ 11.653511] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 11.654135] pc : __power_supply_is_supplied_by+0x18/0x100 [ 11.654624] lr : __power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x40/0xb8 [ 11.655098] sp : ffff80008192bb30 [ 11.655399] x29: ffff80008192bb30 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 11.656049] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 11.656695] x23: ffff0000c19f4200 x22: ffffdb2232ba4ea8 x21: ffff80008192bc28 [ 11.657344] x20: ffff0000c1eef000 x19: ffff80008192bc18 x18: 00000000a0886e62 [ 11.657991] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 04500072b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 11.658639] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000220 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 11.659286] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff0000c1fdb2b0 x9 : ffffdb2232ba5590 [ 11.659934] x8 : 00000000e5b906e6 x7 : ffff0000c2502778 x6 : ffffdb22339793d0 [ 11.660581] x5 : ffff80008192bc18 x4 : ffff0000c19cbca0 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 11.661228] x2 : ffff0000c1fdaf40 x1 : ffffffffffffffed x0 : ffff0000c1eef000 [ 11.661878] Call trace: [ 11.662103] __power_supply_is_supplied_by+0x18/0x100 (P) [ 11.662596] __power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x40/0xb8 [ 11.663040] psy_for_each_psy_cb+0x20/0x40 [ 11.663416] class_for_each_device+0x110/0x150 [ 11.663825] power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x68/0x100 [ 11.664262] bq257xx_external_power_changed+0x58/0x140 [ 11.664733] __power_supply_changed_work+0x60/0x80 [ 11.665170] psy_for_each_psy_cb+0x20/0x40 [ 11.665545] class_for_each_device+0x110/0x150 [ 11.665953] power_supply_changed_work+0x98/0x1b8 [ 11.666382] process_one_work+0x164/0x4c0 [ 11.666758] worker_thread+0x19c/0x320 [ 11.667104] kthread+0x138/0x150 [ 11.667408] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 11.667744] Code: d503233f a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 (f9400c34) [ 11.668294] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Add a read-write semaphore between external_power_changed() and power_supply_unregister() to prevent the latter from returning (and thus the driver from freeing its data) while the callback is still running.
-
CVE-2026-99216
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: Don't reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths In two places, current code forces vmbus_connection.conn_state to DISCONNECTED prior to calling vmbus_disconnect(). But vmbus_disconnect() calls vmbus_initiate_unload(), which unloads the VMBus connection only if the conn_state is CONNECTED. Consequently, the connection remains and the Hyper-V host might continue to send messages or post VMBus interrupts. The problem was introduced in commit 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback"), in that vmbus_initiate_unload() started checking the current connection state before doing the unload. This commit removed some occurrences where conn_state was forced to DISCONNECTED, but these two remained, apparently due to an oversight at the time. Fix this by not forcing conn_state to DISCONNECTED during VMBus exit, or if a failure occurs when establishing the connection in the first place. Whatever value conn_state has at the time is then read by vmbus_initiate_unload() to determine if there is a connection to be unloaded.
-
CVE-2026-99207
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Disable interrupts while holding delayed_cmd_lock target_do_delayed_work() takes dev->delayed_cmd_lock with a plain spin_lock(). It runs from system_percpu_wq, so interrupts stay enabled while the lock is held. Every other acquisition of that lock uses spin_lock_irqsave(): target_handle_task_attr() and transport_complete_ordered_sync() in target_core_transport.c, and target_non_ordered_release() in target_core_device.c. That was safe while every caller of transport_complete_task_attr() ran in process context: target_complete_ok_work() from target_completion_wq, transport_complete_qf() from dev->qf_work_queue, and transport_generic_request_failure() from the submit and execute paths. Since commit 06933066d88a ("scsi: target: Add support for completing commands from backend context") that is no longer true. With complete_type=1 on a fabric that sets direct_compl_supp, target_complete() runs target_complete_ok_work() inline in the backend's completion context, which target_complete_cmd_with_sense() documents as "May be called from interrupt context". For iblock that is the bio end_io. target_complete_ok_work() starts with transport_complete_task_attr(), which takes delayed_cmd_lock in two ways: - Every ORDERED command is put on dev->delayed_cmd_list by target_handle_task_attr() and dispatched from there by target_do_delayed_work(), which marks it SCF_TASK_ORDERED_SYNC. Its completion therefore goes through transport_complete_ordered_sync(). - A SIMPLE command that completes while an ORDERED command is pending drops the last reference to the killed dev->non_ordered, and percpu_ref_put() then runs target_non_ordered_release() in the completing context. Both take the lock and, if commands are waiting, call schedule_work(&dev->delayed_cmd_work), which queues on system_percpu_wq, i.e. on the CPU that took the completion. Further completions for the same queue are typically delivered there too, so one arriving while the work holds the lock spins on it forever. Reaching this needs complete_type=1, which is not the default (vhost-scsi, the only fabric with direct_compl_supp, defaults to TARGET_QUEUE_COMPL), a backend whose I/O completes from interrupt context, and ORDERED commands from the initiator. Linux virtio_scsi guests send only VIRTIO_SCSI_S_SIMPLE and never take the ordered path; any guest that uses the ORDERED task attribute, which vhost-scsi accepts, does. target_do_delayed_work() is a work item and always runs in process context, so spin_lock_irq() is sufficient. Found by inspection; no runtime report. A single ORDERED command goes through both acquisitions, so with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING the first one completed through direct completion should produce an inconsistent lock state report on delayed_cmd_lock (hardirq or softirq, depending on where the backend completes).
-
CVE-2026-99208
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/oa: Zero OA buffer at allocation ttm_bo_type_kernel BOs are not guaranteed to be zeroed on allocation and may contain data from previously freed pages. Since the OA buffer is mmap'able by userspace, this can expose stale kernel memory contents. Streams opened with DRM_XE_OA_PROPERTY_OA_DISABLED allocate the OA buffer without calling xe_oa_init_oa_buffer(). Zero the buffer at allocation to prevent information disclosure through mmap. The existing zeroing in xe_oa_init_oa_buffer() remains necessary for zero report-id/timestamp detection on enable/re-enable. (cherry picked from commit 126c4c5388f9311a390b9b254a835b0cf0f55331)
-
CVE-2026-99209
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: skip eviction of a BO with no resource xe_evict_flags() switches on tbo->resource->mem_type to choose an eviction placement. An xe BO can reach eviction with no ttm.resource, e.g. an imported dma-buf BO whose resource was freed during teardown while its attachment is still live: the exporter then invalidates it via xe_dma_buf_move_notify() -> xe_bo_evict(), and the switch dereferences a NULL resource and faults. A BO with no resource has nothing placed or mapped, so there is nothing to evict. Return an empty placement (num_placement = 0), mirroring the handling already used for non-xe scatter-gather BOs just above; ttm_bo_validate() then takes the pipeline-gutting path and returns 0. Without the fix the xe_dma_buf@xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource dynamic live selftest will fail with below stack. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 RIP: 0010:xe_evict_flags+0xf4/0x140 [xe] Call Trace: <TASK> xe_bo_evict+0x40/0xa0 [xe] ? ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting+0x71/0x180 [ttm] xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource+0x182/0x440 [xe] xe_dma_buf_kunit+0x387/0x580 [xe] v2: Add Fixes tag and failure info in commit text (Matt Brost) (cherry picked from commit dbcfaac6331f1fcb0c2fe3ad3e9adb1e5d43ec0c)
-
CVE-2026-99210
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: clear rdev on device init failure rocket_probe() stores the return value from rocket_device_init() in the file-scoped rdev pointer before checking whether it is an error pointer. If rocket_device_init() fails, rdev is left as an ERR_PTR. The rdev pointer is also used as the marker for whether the shared rocket device has already been initialized. A later core probe can therefore see a non-NULL rdev, skip rocket_device_init(), and dereference the error pointer when reading rdev->num_cores. Save the error code and clear rdev before returning from the rocket_device_init() failure path.
-
CVE-2026-99211
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: reset skb headers before unicast and multicast filtering Socket filters can use SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF to read relative to an skb's network and MAC headers. Netlink producers may reserve headroom without resetting those headers, allowing a receiving socket's filter to read data before the initialized message. For example, IWPM HELLO replies are allocated with dev_alloc_skb(), which reserves NET_SKB_PAD bytes. An unprivileged NETLINK_RDMA user can attach a classic socket filter and disclose this headroom through the length of the delivered reply. The resets in netlink_dump() do not help because IWPM sends a separately allocated skb through netlink_unicast(). Reset both headers before running the receiver's filter in unicast and broadcast delivery, as is already done for dump skbs. This also covers other netlink producers that reserve headroom without changing their allocation or message-building code.
-
CVE-2026-99212
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED. A synchronous failure there - -ENOMEM from the route work allocation, an SA query that cannot be set up, a RoCE route with no usable device - makes addr_handler() destroy the id the event was delivered on. That id is ic->i_cm_id, and nothing clears the pointer: the connection sits in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING with a freed id until its shutdown calls rdma_disconnect() and rdma_destroy_id() on it. The ROUTE_RESOLVED case already avoids this: rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect() forces a zero return while ic->i_cm_id == cm_id, as the comment there explains. Do the same here - drop the connection and return 0 - so the id stays RDS's to destroy from the shutdown, and the reconnect gets a fresh one.
-
CVE-2026-99213
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it. Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending(). Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs, and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table. list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130 Call Trace: vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460 vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480 process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560 worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60 kthread+0x36e/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link.
-
CVE-2026-99214
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: hdmi: Move packet RAM enable to PM runtime Audio can be triggered by the HPD handler and start up before video has been restored, calling vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() for the audio infoframe. vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() needs Packet RAM to be on to store the infoframe, however, if the video hasn't been enabled, vc4_hdmi_encoder_post_crtc_enable() hasn't been called and therefore, the Packet RAM can be disabled by the time vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() executes, causing the following splat: [ 201.570266] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 201.570293] Packet RAM has to be on to store the packet. [ 201.570367] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c:683 at vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe+0x404/0x494 [vc4], CPU#0: wireplumber/1606 [...] [ 201.658650] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.5 (DT) [...] [ 201.758499] Call trace: [ 201.760967] vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe+0x404/0x494 [vc4] (P) [ 201.766607] vc4_hdmi_write_audio_infoframe+0x1c/0x28 [vc4] [ 201.772247] write_infoframe+0xbc/0x140 [drm_display_helper] [ 201.777975] drm_atomic_helper_connector_hdmi_update_audio_infoframe+0x80/0xdc [drm_display_helper] [ 201.787140] vc4_hdmi_audio_prepare+0x4ac/0x570 [vc4] [ 201.792252] drm_connector_hdmi_audio_prepare+0x24/0x30 [drm_display_helper] [ 201.799390] hdmi_codec_prepare+0x100/0x160 [snd_soc_hdmi_codec] [ 201.805471] snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare+0xd4/0x100 [snd_soc_core] [ 201.811375] __soc_pcm_prepare+0x60/0x12c [snd_soc_core] [ 201.816752] soc_pcm_prepare+0x34/0x58 [snd_soc_core] [ 201.821863] snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x70/0x8c [snd_pcm] [ 201.826798] snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xe4/0x174 [snd_pcm] [ 201.832350] snd_pcm_prepare+0xc8/0xd8 [snd_pcm] [ 201.837021] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x458/0x614 [snd_pcm] [ 201.842308] snd_pcm_ioctl+0x30/0x48 [snd_pcm] [ 201.846802] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xd8 [ 201.850769] invoke_syscall+0x48/0xf4 [ 201.854470] el0_svc_common+0x80/0xd8 [ 201.858171] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 201.861520] el0_svc+0x3c/0xb0 [ 201.864605] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc [ 201.868834] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [ 201.872536] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Considering that Packet RAM enable is essentially a power management configuration, move its enabling/disabling to the Runtime PM hooks. Note that post_crtc_disable() still stops all infoframes, but keeps Packet RAM enabled, leaving it to be disabled by runtime suspend.
-
CVE-2026-99199
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hisilicon: hip04_eth: Move setting of netops to fix crash hip04_mac_probe() calls of_phy_connect() before ndev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99200
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hisilicon: hisi_femac: Move setting of netops to fix crash hisi_femac_drv_probe() connects the PHY before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. phy_link_topo_add_phy from phy_attach_direct+0xec/0x37c of_phy_get_and_connect from hisi_femac_drv_probe+0x1f4/0x558 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99201
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: avoid hashing the network namespace pointer The netlink rhashtable key includes a raw struct net pointer and a user-controlled port ID. Both /proc/net/netlink and socket diagnostics expose the table's bucket order. By binding and rebinding chosen NETLINK_USERSOCK port IDs, an unprivileged reader can distinguish equal buckets and recover the low bits of the Jenkins hash. Its 32-bit seed and the limited set of kernel-image slides can then be searched offline to recover the address of init_net. Use the namespace's unique, non-address net_cookie in the comparison key instead. It is assigned before the per-net initializers run and remains unchanged for the namespace's lifetime. The lookup key and object hash are still built by netlink_compare_arg_init(), keeping lookup, insertion, removal and rehashing consistent while preserving namespace separation. Neither public table walker needs to change. Reading the socket's namespace cookie in netlink_compare() is safe under RCU, including during namespace teardown. netlink_release() removes the socket from the hash table and defers its final put with call_rcu(). cleanup_net() runs the per-net exit methods and waits for outstanding RCU callbacks with rcu_barrier() before freeing namespace storage. Unlike ns.ns_id, net_cookie is also available and initialized during setup_net() in older stable kernels, making the change straightforward to backport to v5.15 and later.
-
CVE-2026-99202
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libsas: Fix SMP IO deadlock during HA resume smp_execute_task_sg() calls pm_runtime_get_sync() on the host before issuing an SMP command. When that command is itself issued from the HA resume path, the get_sync() deadlocks: it waits for the ongoing resume (the device is RPM_RESUMING), while the resume is blocked in sas_drain_work() waiting for that same SMP IO to complete. The deadlock needs an expander-attached SATA disk. During sas_resume_ha() -> sas_drain_work(), DISCE_RESUME -> sas_resume_sata() -> ata_sas_port_resume() requests ATA_EH_RESET, and the hard reset for such a disk is done via SMP PHY CONTROL (sas_ata_hard_reset() -> sas_phy_reset() -> sas_smp_phy_control() -> smp_execute_task_sg()). Direct-attached SATA resets through lldd_control_phy() and SSP devices use TMFs, so neither hits this. Replace the get_sync()/put_sync() pair with pm_runtime_get_noresume()/pm_runtime_put(). smp_execute_task_sg() only needs to hold off autosuspend while the SMP is in flight, and it must not try to resume the host: a sync resume issued from the HA resume path itself is what deadlocks, and by the time sas_resume_ha() runs, hw_init has already reinitialized the hardware, so the device is accessible without one. The usage reference is still required. Discovery work normally runs inside an event worker's PM reference, taken at sas_notify_port_event() notify time and held until the handler has flushed the disco queue. sas_rediscover_ex_phy() however requeues DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN from within the revalidation worker itself, and flush_workqueue() does not wait for work items queued during execution, so that chained revalidation runs with no outer PM reference - without the get_noresume(), its SMP could race autosuspend. For the BSG path, sas_smp_handler() is the only caller which may find the host autosuspended: expander SMP requests do not go through any SCSI device request queue, so nothing else in that path holds the host awake. Resume it there with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and check the result.
-
CVE-2026-99203
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pipe: preserve existing fasync readers on writer setup failure F_SETFL and FIOASYNC decide whether to invoke ->fasync() before pipe_fasync() takes pipe->mutex. Two enables of one O_RDWR FIFO can therefore both enter the callback. fasync_helper() allocates before checking for an existing entry. If the first enable installs both entries, a second enable can update the reader entry and then fail the allocation for the writer entry. The error path removes the pre-existing reader entry, clearing FASYNC while the writer entry remains registered. __fput() then skips ->fasync(), so a later pipe notification can dereference the freed file or its f_owner. An unprivileged memory-pressure reproducer triggers a KASAN slab-use-after-free in send_sigio() through this path. Keep the reader helper's result and undo the registration only if this call added it. The pipe mutex serializes changes to both lists, so a failed new registration still removes its reader, while a failed duplicate preserves the existing registrations and FASYNC. Successful duplicate enables continue to update fa_fd as before.
-
CVE-2026-99204
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/dlm: Protect the recovery list during debugfs reads Recovery participant records must remain alive while debug_state_print() walks reco.node_data and formats their fields. The formatter holds dlm->spinlock, but the recovery participant list is protected by dlm_reco_state_lock. In particular, dlm_destroy_recovery_area() detaches the list under dlm_reco_state_lock and frees the detached records after releasing it. A concurrent debugfs open can therefore read freed memory. Protect the participant traversal and field reads in debug_state_print() with dlm_reco_state_lock, matching the existing list writers. This also serializes the traversal against list_add_tail() during recovery-area initialization. Make the existing lock available to the debug code through dlmcommon.h; the lock remains internal to the OCFS2 DLM module. Release dlm->spinlock after formatting the other domain state and before acquiring dlm_reco_state_lock, so the debug reader does not nest the two locks. Leave recovery list insertion, detachment and freeing unchanged. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810662ef80 by task dlm-state-stres/896 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 896 Comm: dlm-state-stres Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420 ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0 debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0 ? __pfx_debug_state_open+0x10/0x10 full_proxy_open_regular+0x193/0x310 do_dentry_open+0x595/0x12d0 ? __pfx_full_proxy_open_regular+0x10/0x10 vfs_open_consume+0xd1/0x400 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 path_openat+0x18d0/0x2020 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 do_file_open+0x21e/0x470 ? __pfx_do_file_open+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? alloc_fd+0x3a6/0x6b0 do_sys_openat2+0xf4/0x1b0 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __fput+0x5b5/0xa60 __x64_sys_openat+0x136/0x1e0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [Register dump omitted.] </TASK> Allocated by task 880: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610 dlm_remaster_locks+0x147/0x1d90 dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580 dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300 kthread+0x351/0x460 ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 880: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kfree+0x308/0x580 dlm_destroy_recovery_area+0x285/0x460 dlm_remaster_locks+0x17c4/0x1d90 dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580 dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300 kthread+0x351/0x460 ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810662ef80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 32-byte region [ffff88810662ef80, ffff88810662efa0) [Page and memory-state dumps omitted.]
-
CVE-2026-99205
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Call wakeup_preempt() for queued tasks during class change Paul reported recent RCU changes exposed a lost resched where CPU idles with a rcutorture thread waiting while being completely runnable. Dumping the rq state at the time of idling with runnable tasks showed the following: rq->next_class = &fair_sched_class rq->nr_running = 1 rq->cfs.h_nr_queued = 0 rq->rt.rt_nr_running = 1 Although the waiting task was an RT task, "rq->next_class" did not point to rt_sched_class and was stuck at the lower priority fair_sched_class. Inspecting sched_change_end() revealed the following race with __sched_setscheduler() for queued, but non-running tasks: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== __schedule() /* * rq->donor is a fair task that blocks. * rq->next_class = &fair_sched_class */ rq_lock(rq0) pick_next_task() /* nr_running = 0 */ pick_task_fair() sched_balance_newidle() raw_spin_rq_unlock(rq0) rq_lock(rq0) activate_task(rq0, p) /* p is a fair task */ rq0->nr_running++; rq0->cfs.h_nr_queued++; wakeup_preempt(rq, p) rq->next_class = &fair_sched_class resched_curr() rq_unlock(rq0) __sched_setscheduler(p) /* p is moved to SCHED_RR */ task_rq_lock(p) sched_change_begin() rq0->cfs.h_nr_queued--; rq0->rt.rt_nr_running++; sched_change_end() /* * p->on_rq = 1 (ctx->queued) * but p is not rq->donor * (!ctx->running) hence * resched_curr() is and * rq->next_class upgrade is * skipped. */ task_rq_unlock() raw_spin_rq_lock(rq0) /* * rq->nr_running = 1 * rq->cfs.h_nr_queued = 0 * rq->rt.rt_nr_running = 1 * rq->next_class = &fair_sched_class */ if (rq->cfs.h_nr_queued && ...) /* Above is false */ if (rq_modified_above(this_rq, &fair_sched_class)) /* Also false since rq->next_class is still fair */ /* * sched_balance_newidle() is considered to * have failed to pull any fair tasks and no * other wakeups were detected. */ return NULL; /* pick_task_fair() */ pick_task_idle() return rq->idle; next = rq->idle; /* Preemption indicators are lost */ clear_tsk_need_resched(prev); clear_preempt_need_resched(); rq->curr = rq->idle; !!! rq->idle switches in with rq->running == 1 but !need_resched() !!! In simple words, enqueue, followed by a class change of the newly queued task goes unnoticed in rq->next_class indicator and sched_balance_newidle() sees no fair task, nor any higher priority task enqueued. The above sequence will lead to CPU idling with a runnable task on the CPU. Call wakeup_preempt() for ctx->queued cases in sched_change_end() to re-evaluate rq->next_class after class change (ENQUEUE_CLASS) and set the NEED_RESCHED indicator accordingly. Newidle balance will correctly see an enqueue of a higher priority t ---truncated---
-
CVE-2026-99206
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Fix race in discovery auth updates Separate configfs opens can concurrently update the discovery AuthMethod parameter. Both callers may free the same value in iscsi_update_param_value(), causing a double-free. Protect the lookup and replacement with the discovery TPG access lock, as used by the other TPG configfs parameter updates.
-
CVE-2026-99191
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr() calipso_skbuff_setattr() adjusts payload_len by the length of the option it inserts or resizes: payload = ntohs(ip6_hdr->payload_len); ip6_hdr->payload_len = htons(payload + len_delta); GRO can build BIG TCP packets larger than IPV6_MAXPLEN, and stores payload_len == 0 for them; ipv6_payload_len() then falls back to skb->len. For such a packet forwarded to a destination mapped to CALIPSO, the code above writes len_delta (or 65536 + len_delta when shrinking) into payload_len, and ipv6_payload_len() no longer falls back to skb->len. nf_tables, conntrack and sch_cake rely on it. The same arithmetic also wraps when a packet grows past IPV6_MAXPLEN, and a BIG TCP packet that shrinks below IPV6_MAXPLEN should get its real length back. Set payload_len from the skb length with ipv6_set_payload_len(), which stores 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN and the real length otherwise, as ipv6_gro_complete() does. The network header was just reset to skb->data, so skb->len - sizeof(*ip6_hdr) is the payload length. Tested on one kernel (arm64, QEMU) with SELinux permissive, a minimal mdp-generated policy (network_peer_controls=1), "netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:16" and a NetLabel mapping of fd00:2::/64 to CALIPSO DOI 16. calipso_skbuff_setattr() was called through netlbl_skbuff_setattr() from a test-only debugfs hook (not part of this patch) adding a level-only label; payload_len after the call: case before fix after fix real length 1000, unlabeled 1016 1016 1016 70000 GSO, payload_len 0 16 0 70016 65530 GSO, grows past MAXPLEN 10 0 65546 65540 GSO with a 24 byte hop header, shrinks below MAXPLEN 65528 65532 65532 1000 with a 24 byte hop header 992 992 992 (0 means ipv6_payload_len() returns the real length.) On the forward path, with a client injecting unlabeled UDP through a router to a server, the router adds the CALIPSO option and the server delivers all datagrams (Udp6InDatagrams 5, Ip6InTruncatedPkts 0) with this patch.
-
CVE-2026-99192
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block bcmgenet stores first_cb, last_cb and bytes_sent in the skb control block and reads them back on completion to free the skb and credit BQL. ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set, so the stack can resubmit a shared skb that is still in the ring. The next transmit overwrites last_cb, so the earlier slots complete without crediting their bytes and BQL stalls the queue until the watchdog resets it. Unshare the skb before writing the control block. Reproduce with pktgen in clone_skb mode, which hands the driver the same skb while earlier copies are still in the ring: modprobe pktgen pg=/proc/net/pktgen echo "add_device eth0" > $pg/kpktgend_0 echo "dst_mac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > $pg/eth0 echo "dst 192.0.2.1" > $pg/eth0 echo "clone_skb 8" > $pg/eth0 echo "count 0" > $pg/eth0 echo start > $pg/pgctrl & sleep 5 echo stop > $pg/pgctrl wait cat /sys/class/net/eth0/queues/tx-0/byte_queue_limits/inflight inflight stays nonzero on the now idle queue. clone_skb 0 leaves it at zero.
-
CVE-2026-99193
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ti: icssm-prueth: Move setting of netops to fix crash icssm_prueth_netdev_init() calls of_phy_get_and_connect() before ndev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99194
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: aeroflex: move setting of netops to fix crash greth_of_probe() calls greth_mdio_init(), which connects the PHY, before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99195
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethoc: move setting of netops to fix crash ethoc_probe() calls ethoc_mdio_probe(), which connects the PHY, before netdev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99196
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: au1000: move setting of netops to fix crash au1000_probe() calls au1000_mii_probe(), which connects the PHY, before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99197
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mv643xx: move setting of netops to fix crash mv643xx_eth_probe() connects the PHY before dev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99198
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: actions: Move setting of netops to fix crash owl_emac_probe() calls owl_emac_phy_init(), which connects the PHY, before netdev->netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() -> phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled. Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit 7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99182
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Fix shift-out-of-bounds for aggregated ALH capture When ch_count is smaller than blob->alh_cfg.device_count (e.g. a mono capture stream, such as a SmartMic, aggregated across multiple SDW links), step = ch_count / blob->alh_cfg.device_count truncates to 0. The subsequent GENMASK(step - 1, 0) then underflows step - 1 (u32) to UINT_MAX, causing GENMASK()'s internal shift to use an out-of-bounds exponent: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c:2363:13 shift exponent 18446744069414584384 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' Treat ch_count < device_count the same way as the existing "channels equal to output reference channels" case: apply the same ch_mask to every aggregated device instead of trying to split channels that can't be evenly divided.
-
CVE-2026-99183
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: search every core slot when looking up a scheduler sched_to_core() walks rdev->cores[] up to rdev->num_cores, and rocket_remove() decrements num_cores for every core it removes. Unbind a core that is not the last one and the cores behind it fall outside the search, so sched_to_core() returns NULL for a core that is still bound and still running jobs. Neither caller checks the result: rocket_job_run(): rocket_fence_create(core), core->dev rocket_job_timedout(): dev_err(core->dev, "NPU job timed out") Unbinding the middle core of the three on an RK3588 while three clients are submitting to all of them faults twice, once from the surviving core's job queue and once from its reset work: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000220-0x0000000000000227] Workqueue: fdad0000.npu drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] pc : rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket] Call trace: rocket_job_run+0x234/0x838 [rocket] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x2cc/0xad8 [gpu_sched] process_one_work+0x640/0x14f0 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: rocket-reset-2 drm_sched_job_timedout [gpu_sched] pc : rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket] Call trace: rocket_job_timedout+0xf0/0x1e0 [rocket] drm_sched_job_timedout+0x188/0x6a0 [gpu_sched] Both are the third core: the workqueue names are its device and its core->index, and it was left at slot 2 while num_cores had dropped to 2. Search all the slots that were allocated, the way find_core_for_dev() now does. A core that is still bound is then found, and the two callers get the pointer they already assume they have. This does not make unbinding one core out of several safe. An open client keeps an entity pointing at the scheduler of the core that went away: drm_sched reports it as not ready for every job that lands on it, and the client waits in dma_fence_default_wait for a fence that will never signal. Stopping the NULL dereference is what belongs in a fix; the rest wants more thought.
-
CVE-2026-99184
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: search every core slot when a core is removed rocket_remove() decrements rdev->num_cores for each core it removes, while find_core_for_dev() searches slots 0 to num_cores - 1. Unbinding the cores in the order they were bound therefore loses the last one: by the time it is removed the search range has already shrunk past its slot, so find_core_for_dev() returns -1 and rocket_remove() gives up without doing anything. num_cores never reaches zero, rocket_device_fini() never runs, and the file-scoped rdev keeps pointing at a device that is going away. Binding the cores again starts from that stale count, because rocket_probe() takes rdev->num_cores as the slot to fill. On an RK3588, which describes three cores, the second round lands on slots 1, 2 and 3 while rdev->cores was allocated with room for three: rocket fdab0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 1 version: 1179210309 rocket fdac0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 2 version: 1179210309 rocket fdad0000.npu: Rockchip NPU core 3 version: 1179210309 The write to rdev->cores[3] is past the end of the array. Nothing in tree reads the core array often enough to notice, so the overrun is silent today. It turned up while testing a devfreq series on top of this, where a worker walks every core a few times a second, and UBSAN caught the first bool it read out of the overrun entry: UBSAN: invalid-load in drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_devfreq.c:47:10 load of value 5 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' Workqueue: devfreq_wq devfreq_monitor Record how many slots were allocated and search all of them. Every core is then found on removal, num_cores reaches zero, the device is torn down and a later bind starts from a clean rdev. This does not make unbinding a single core out of several work. probe still takes num_cores as the slot to fill, so rebinding one core while its siblings stay bound would write over a slot that is already in use, and rocket_open() still reaches for cores[0] whether or not anything is there. Both of those want more thought than a fix should carry. Found by unbinding and rebinding all three cores on an Orange Pi 5 Plus. With this applied, 25 unbind/rebind rounds and 5 module unload/reload rounds run clean there: the cores land in slots 0, 1 and 2 every time, whichever order they are bound in, and the shared supply goes back to a single user after each round.
-
CVE-2026-99185
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling For a split transaction, either fw_core_handle_response() or split_transaction_timeout_callback() may manipulate the same transaction entry in the pending transaction list. The return value of timer_delete() is used to determine which function handles the entry. If the transaction is a split transaction and timer_delete() returns zero, the timeout callback may already be running. In this case, the response handler must leave the entry in the list for the timeout callback to remove. A previous code refactoring broke this behavior, introducing a race condition in which both functions could process the same transaction. This could lead to a use-after-free on the transaction initiator side. Fix the regression by ensuring that the response handler does not process the transaction when timer_delete() returns zero. The timeout callback is responsible for removing the entry from the pending transaction list.
-
CVE-2026-99186
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/insn-eval: Fix shadowed segment index in get_seg_reg_override_idx() Commit 45e1dccc0653 ("x86/insn: Simplify for_each_insn_prefix()") made for_each_insn_prefix() declare its own loop counter named idx. get_seg_reg_override_idx() keeps its result in a local of the same name, so the assignments in the loop body now write the loop counter: - the function always returns INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT, so FS and GS overrides are ignored; - a CS override sets the counter to INAT_SEG_REG_CS (2), the increment makes it 3, and prefixes.bytes[3] holds the last prefix, 0x2e again, so the loop never terminates. The UMIP emulation reaches this from the #GP handler for user space: an SGDT, SIDT or SMSW with a memory operand and a CS prefix leaves the task spinning in the kernel, never returning to user space, with a SIGKILL that is never delivered. Any user can thus tie up CPUs until reboot. With an FS or GS prefix, the emulated result is written to the wrong address. Rename the internal macro iterator variable. [ Lukas' original patch renamed the use site, I changed it to rename the iterator in the macro instead, but left Lukas' commit message and authorship - Linus ]
-
CVE-2026-99187
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix perf_pmu_migrate_context() leaving events behind __perf_pmu_remove() walks the group leaders of a CPU and PMU with perf_event_groups_for_cpu_pmu(), removing each one as it goes. perf_remove_from_context() takes the leader out of the groups rbtree, after which rb_next() on that node returns NULL, prematurely ending the walk. Other groups stay behind in the source context. On CPU hotplug, they are then torn down with the dying CPU. They keep running until teardown, while the PMU's interrupt and migrated events are on a new CPU, which drivers rely on never happening. Walk ctx->event_list instead and pick out the PMU's events by their pmu_ctx.
-
CVE-2026-99188
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: dwmac1000: clear the RGMII status interrupt Since commit 2e2c878a3141 ("net: stmmac: remove SGMII/RGMII/SMII interrupt handling") nothing on the RGMII path reads GMAC_RGSMIIIS, so RGSMIIIS stays pending behind GMAC_INT_MASK from the first link change on. stmmac_resume() resets the MAC in stmmac_hw_setup(); the reset sets GMAC_INT_MASK to 0 until dwmac1000_core_init() writes the mask again, and the pending status storms the line: dwmac_dma_interrupt: unexpected status 04000000 A register dump at the first message on ODROID-HC4 showed it: core int_status 00000001 int_mask 00000000 pmt 00000000 rgsmiiis 0000000d When the resume thread runs on the CPU that takes the MAC interrupt, the storm starves it: a soft lockup, then a watchdog reset or a hang. Read GMAC_RGSMIIIS in dwmac1000_irq_status() when the status is not masked, as the driver did before 2e2c878a3141; the read clears it. Wake-on-LAN resume from s2idle with the resume thread and the MAC interrupt on one CPU: Helios64 (dwmac-rk), 7.3-rc6, soft-locked in 3 of 3 resumes without a fix and in 0 of 10 with this patch; it ran with an out-of-tree dwmac-rk change that keeps the GMAC powered across suspend. ODROID-HC4 (dwmac-meson8b): 0 of 10 with this patch, 2 of 2 without a fix on a 7.3-rc5 build. irq_rgmii_n went up by one per resume.
-
CVE-2026-99189
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: mxc: fix race between chained IRQ handler install and probe completion mxc_update_irq_chained_handler() is called before the IRQ domain, the generic IRQ chip, and the port list entry are set up. If an interrupt arrives in that window: - mx3_gpio_irq_handler() calls generic_handle_domain_irq() with port->domain still NULL. - mx2_gpio_irq_handler() walks mxc_gpio_ports, but the port has not been added to the list yet. Additionally, if any of the subsequent probe steps (gpio_generic_chip_init(), devm_gpiochip_add_data(), irq_domain_create_legacy(), or mxc_gpio_init_gc()) fail, the error paths never unregister the chained handler, leaving a dangling handler that points at freed memory. Move the handler installation after all its dependencies are ready and after list_add_tail(), so the handler is never live while the data structures it touches are incomplete, and is never installed if probe fails.
The newest published CVE records from CVE.org and NVD, refreshed every few minutes, with severity, exploit odds and fix status.