CVE-20XX-?
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CVEs with no patch, advisory or fixed version linked, ranked by severity and exploit odds.

7,557 CVEs · updated 2026-11-21 06:16 UTC

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  1. CVE-2026-116115

    A security vulnerability has been detected in Yoosee GM8135S Camera 21.00.01.36. This impacts an unknown function of the file wpa_supplicantX.conf of the component WiFi Configuration. Such manipulation leads to improper initialization. The attack can only be initiated within the local network. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

    Other Device

    1.3 LOW 0.3% exploit odds No fix listed
  2. CVE-2026-116054

    A security vulnerability has been detected in SH3. This affects an unknown function of the component Módulo de Gestão/Módulo de Arrecadação. The manipulation leads to password hash with insufficient computational effort. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. A high degree of complexity is needed for the attack. The exploitability is reported as difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. Upgrading to version 2026.0.2.0 mitigates this issue. Upgrading the affected component is recommended.

    Crypto

    1.2 LOW 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  3. CVE-2026-99287

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-netback: Zero out sring pointers on unmap If xenvif_map_frontend_data_rings() fails when a ring is already mapped, it unmaps them via xenvif_unmap_frontend_data_rings() which keeps the ring pointers unchanged. xenvif_connect_data()'s cleanup path calls xenvif_disconnect_queue() which in turn calls xenvif_unmap_frontend_data_rings() again, which will attempt to unmap the pointers a second time. Zero out the ring pointers after they are unmapped to avoid this issue. This is XSA-532

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  4. CVE-2026-99286

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-netback: Fix XenBus connection failure cleanup xenvif_get_stats and xenvif_get_ethtool_stats capture vif->num_queues under rcu_read_lock. We need to unpublish vif->num_queues before synchronize_net to ensure that readers that come afterwards will not read a non-zero vif->num_queues and attempt to access invalid queues. This is the same cleanup algorithm as used in backend_disconnect and added in commit b17075d5c198 ("xen-netback: fix race condition on XenBus disconnect"). This is XSA-531

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  5. CVE-2026-99285

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_byteorder: remove multi-register support 64bit byteorder conversion is broken when several registers need to be converted because the source register array advances in steps for 4 bytes instead of 8: for (i = ... src64 = nft_reg_load64(&src[i]); ~~~~~ u32 *src nft_reg_store64(&dst64[i], Remove the multi-register support, it has other issues as well: Pablo points out that commit caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval") alters semantics: before the loop operated on registers, i.e. for ( ... ) dst32[i] = htons((u16)src32[i]) .. but after the patch it will operate on bytes, which makes this useless to convert e.g. concatenations, which store each compound in its own register. Multi-convert of u32 has one theoretical application: ct mark . meta mark . tcp dport @intervalset Because ct mark and meta mark are host byte order, use with intervals has to convert the byteorder for ct/meta mark value to network byte order (bigendian). nftables emits this: [ meta load mark => reg 1 ] [ byteorder reg 1 = hton(reg 1, 4, 4) ] [ ct load mark => reg 9 ] [ byteorder reg 9 = hton(reg 9, 4, 4) ] ... I.e. two separate calls. Theoretically it could be changed to do: [ meta load mark => reg 1 ] [ ct load mark => reg 9 ] [ byteorder reg 1 = htonl(reg 1, 4, 8) ] ... But then all it would take to change the set to meta mark . tcp dport . ct mark ... and we'd be back to two "byteorder" calls. IOW, support to convert a range of registers is both dysfunctional and dubious. Simplify this: remove the feature. Pablo Neira Ayuso points out that nftables before 1.1.0 can generate incorrect byteorder conversions, see 9fe58952c45a, "evaluate: skip byteorder conversion for selector smaller than 2 bytes" in nftables.git). Affected rulesets fail to load with this change and old userspace due to 'len != size' check.

    Other OS & kernel Linux

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  6. CVE-2026-59599

    Android on supported Pixel devices before security patch level 2026-11-05 allows elevation of privilege in the hypervisor subcomponent in the kernel, aka A-519434175.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored No fix listed
  7. CVE-2026-99284

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker in skb_zerocopy() skb_zerocopy() moves frag descriptors from @from into @to and takes a reference on each frag, but it does not copy skb_shinfo(from)->flags into skb_shinfo(to)->flags. A destination skb holding the same page-cache backed frags as the source therefore reports skb_has_shared_frag() as false. That breaks the invariant relied on by later in-place writers. ESP input checks skb_has_shared_frag() before deciding whether an uncloned nonlinear skb can skip skb_cow_data(); with the marker lost, an skb that skb_zerocopy() built for nfnetlink_queue or for an openvswitch upcall is decrypted in place, letting an unprivileged user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file. Propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG when frag descriptors are copied, as done for the other frag-transfer helpers.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  8. CVE-2026-99283

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: tcp: use UNACK timeout for non-closing RST packets Commit be0502a3f2e9 ("netfilter: conntrack: tcp: only close if RST matches exact sequence") keeps an established conntrack entry in ESTABLISHED when an in-window RST does not match the expected sequence number exactly, so the endpoint can validate the RST with a challenge ACK. The timeout selection nevertheless uses the CLOSE timeout for every RST packet. The bug is that timeout selection is based on the packet type, not on the state transition result: even when RST validation keeps new_state in ESTABLISHED, the timeout is still forced to TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE. Linux TCP independently rate limits challenge ACKs per socket. A second non-exact RST can therefore arrive after the first challenge ACK has restored the timeout but before the rate limit expires. The second RST lowers the timeout to 10 seconds again while the endpoint suppresses the second challenge ACK, allowing the conntrack entry to expire while both TCP endpoints remain established. Using the ESTABLISHED timeout for such RSTs would avoid this short expiration window, but it could also retain stale entries for the five-day default because conntrack cannot reliably match the endpoint's exact TCP state. Use the UNACK timeout for RST packets that leave the conntrack entry in TCP_CONNTRACK_ESTABLISHED. Exact-match RSTs and accepted RST packet trains still fall through to timeouts[new_state], which preserves the CLOSE timeout when conntrack accepts the RST as closing the flow. This avoids the aggressive 10-second expiration window for non-exact RSTs while preserving the short timeout for RSTs that conntrack accepts as closing the flow.

    Other OS & kernel Linux

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  9. CVE-2026-99278

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: limit sessions on each connection The pending setup limit only counts InProgress sessions. A client can complete authentication repeatedly and retain an unbounded number of Valid sessions on one connection. Reserve a connection slot before allocating a session and retain a connection reference while authentication is in progress. The first SMB3 channel takes over that reservation; binding to another connection reserves one slot there. Reauthentication and authentication continuation reuse the existing reservation. Return slots on allocation or insertion failure, channel removal, and final session destruction. Accept max_sessions_per_connection in reserved startup-request space and default to 64 when older tools leave it zero. Keep the request size and existing field offsets unchanged. Expose the configured limit in procfs. The existing connection limits bound the aggregate number of sessions without a separate global session allocation limit.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  10. CVE-2026-99275

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject short SESSION_SETUP responses smb2_check_message() accepts frames shorter than struct smb2_pdu when the SMB2 status is non-zero, before the minimum-PDU check added by b4694f269e66d. A 64-byte STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED SESSION_SETUP response is therefore accepted even though it cannot contain the SecurityBufferOffset and SecurityBufferLength fields. The parser then reads those fields from stale bytes left in the reused receive buffer by an earlier frame. With a long stale SecurityBufferLength, decode_ntlmssp_challenge() copies up to about 64 KB from beyond the receive object and sends the data back to the server in the NTLMv2 AUTHENTICATE target info. Reject short MPR SESSION_SETUP responses before the short-error path, and validate SecurityBufferOffset + SecurityBufferLength against the received response length before decoding the challenge. The ordering bypass is not new: the short-error early return predates b4694f269e66d, and the unvalidated SecurityBufferLength read predates the 2016 raw NTLMSSP split in 166cea4dc3a4, so all supported stable trees are affected. Reproduced on 6.6.87.2; the path is unchanged on mainline.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  11. CVE-2026-99282

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_teql: fix use-after-free on lower qdisc drop The issue: teql_master_xmit() tests the slave's ndo_start_xmit() return value against NETDEV_TX_OK alone. A slave that consumes the skb but returns an error code (rc < NET_XMIT_MASK, e.g. NET_XMIT_DROP) is treated as if the skb were still owned, so the loop restores skb->dev and calls __skb_pull() on it. A VLAN slave returns the result of dev_queue_xmit() from its ndo_start_xmit() (propagated since cbbef5e18307), and when the lower qdisc drops the packet that value is NET_XMIT_DROP after the skb has been freed, giving a use-after-free in teql_master_xmit(). The Fix: test for consumption with dev_xmit_complete(), which accepts NETDEV_TX_OK and every rc < NET_XMIT_MASK, matching other callers that need to distinguish consumed results from busy. Only NETDEV_TX_OK keeps the packet counted in tx_packets/tx_bytes and advances the slave; a consumed result that is neither a success nor NET_XMIT_CN ends the attempt and is charged to tx_dropped, so lower-qdisc drops are no longer reported as good transmits. NET_XMIT_CN is counted like success because it can accompany acceptance of the current packet: pfifo_head_drop drops the old head, enqueues the current skb and returns NET_XMIT_CN. Conditions to recreate the bug: With CONFIG_NET_SCH_TEQL, CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q and CONFIG_DUMMY enabled, add lkrdummy0 (dummy) and lkrvlan0 (VLAN id 37 on lkrdummy0); set a pfifo limit 0 root on lkrdummy0 and a teql0 root on lkrvlan0; bring teql0 up with an address and send one UDP packet to it. The VLAN xmit returns NET_XMIT_DROP from the lower qdisc while holding a freed skb.

    Memory safety OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  12. CVE-2026-99271

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: line6: Clear prev_fbuf on capture buffer release A KASAN slab-use-after-free read was reported in submit_audio_out_urb() when generating an impulse test signal: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in create_impulse_test_signal sound/usb/line6/playback.c:76 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in submit_audio_out_urb+0x1848/0x1b20 sound/usb/line6/playback.c:249 Read of size 2 at addr ffff888008d74870 by task syz.2.3214/7785 Allocated by task 11: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2f0/0x390 mm/slub.c:4144 line6_buffer_acquire+0x1a1/0x220 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:158 line6_pcm_acquire+0xb6/0x230 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:329 line6_startup_work+0x3c/0x50 sound/usb/line6/driver.c:728 Freed by task 7785: kfree+0xf8/0x390 mm/slub.c:6566 line6_buffer_release sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:176 [inline] line6_buffer_release+0xa5/0xf0 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:170 __line6_pcm_release sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:305 [inline] line6_pcm_release+0x5a/0x80 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:313 snd_toneport_monitor_put+0x11b/0x190 sound/usb/line6/toneport.c:183 line6pcm->prev_fbuf points into the capture PCM stream buffer (line6pcm->in.buffer), which is updated during audio_in_callback() to feed rate synchronization, software monitoring, and impulse test signal generation on playback side. When all capture streams are closed, line6_buffer_release() frees pstr->buffer with kfree(). However, it does not clear line6pcm->prev_fbuf. If playback is subsequently started (e.g. via impulse test signal volume control snd_line6_impulse_volume_put()), submit_audio_out_urb() dereferences the stale pointer line6pcm->prev_fbuf under in.lock, resulting in a slab-use-after-free read. Clear prev_fbuf and prev_fsize in line6_buffer_release() when releasing the capture stream buffer under in.lock, ensuring that no stale buffer pointer can be accessed by submit_audio_out_urb().

    Memory safety OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  13. CVE-2026-99272

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate the data area in SMB2_read() SMB2_read() copies le32_to_cpu(rsp->DataLength) bytes from (char *)rsp + rsp->DataOffset without checking that the range lies within the response actually received. A READ response with DataOffset == 0 makes smb2_get_data_area_len() zero the data length, so smb2_check_message() accepts a frame as short as the fixed response, while SMB2_read() still uses the server-supplied DataLength, capped only by CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE and the caller's length. A malicious server can answer the synchronous read used by the mfsymlinks (or SFU) symlink parser with an 81-byte READ response carrying DataOffset 0 and DataLength 1067, making the client copy 1067 bytes from a 448-byte receive object (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds; up to 16 KiB in the general case). Clamp a zero (or header-overlapping) DataOffset to read_rsp_size, as handle_read_data() does for the asynchronous path, and reject the response unless DataOffset + DataLength fits within rsp_iov.iov_len. The SMB1 helper was fixed the same way in 5be5bdda5863.

    Memory safety OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  14. CVE-2026-99273

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reserve space for the UTF-16 terminator in stream info smb_strtoUTF16() always writes a terminating zero UTF-16 unit after the converted characters, but get_file_stream_info() budgets only sizeof(struct smb2_file_stream_info) + streamlen * 2 for a stream entry and sizeof(struct smb2_file_stream_info) + 7 * 2 for the trailing "::$DATA" entry. When an entry exactly fills the 448-byte small response buffer, the terminator is written two bytes past the allocation. Reserve one extra UTF-16 unit in both budget checks. The terminator is not part of the wire format, so the reported lengths are unchanged.

    Memory safety OS & kernel Linux

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  15. CVE-2026-99274

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix fiemap wild read on empty truncated response smb3_fiemap() treats -E2BIG from SMB2_ioctl() as a truncated range blob and loops for the next chunk. If the server reports STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW with OutputCount == 0, SMB2_ioctl() returns -E2BIG with out_data == NULL and out_data_len == 0, and the existing length checks accept the empty result. The loop then evaluates next = out_data[num - 1].file_offset + ... with num == 0, reading 16 bytes before NULL. Reject a truncated range blob that contains no range, so the resume offset is never computed from an empty response. Also require the last range in a truncated blob to advance the resume offset without overflowing, and to stay within the requested range; a malicious or broken server could otherwise make no progress or underflow len and loop forever. Free the previous response buffer before retrying. Reproduced on 6.6.87.2 with a malicious SMB2 server that answers FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES with STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW and OutputCount == 0; an FS_IOC_FIEMAP ioctl on the mount oopses in cifs_fiemap() with CR2 = fffffffffffffff8. The code path is unchanged on mainline.

    Memory safety OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  16. CVE-2026-99280

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: drain session procfs readers before dropping table references Session registration failure and connection cleanup can drop the table reference while the per-session procfs entry is still accessible. If a reader holds the last remaining reference, its final put calls proc_remove() from its own callback and waits for that callback to finish. Remove the procfs entry before dropping the table reference in the registration failure path. Queue sessions removed during connection cleanup and drain their procfs readers after releasing both session locks, then return their table references. Keep the global hash node unhashed while a session is queued so a concurrent unregister cannot drop the reference again. Previous-session replacement also destroys the file table before the session is finally freed. Detach the idr under the lock used by procfs file counters, and report zero files after it has been detached. This prevents a reader from accessing the idr during or after its destruction.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.1% exploit odds No fix listed
  17. CVE-2026-99276

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: defer connection scavenging while session locks are busy The expiration worker holds conn_list_lock for reading while checking for authenticated sessions. Without this change, the check can wait for conn->session_lock or sessions_table_lock. In destroy_previous_session(), the status updates after ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess() run with both session locks held for writing. Both the KSMBD_SESS_GOOD error path and the KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP success path call ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(), which takes conn_list_lock for reading. A writer queued on conn_list_lock can block these new read acquisitions. The worker then waits for a session lock held by destroy_previous_session(), which waits behind the writer. The writer cannot proceed until the worker releases conn_list_lock. Try both session locks instead of waiting in the scavenging check. Keep the connection when either lock is busy and let the periodic worker retry later.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.1% exploit odds No fix listed
  18. CVE-2026-99279

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reclaim ended sessions on logoff and expiration LOGOFF and previous-session replacement leave sessions Expired with a zero credential expiry. Ended sessions can retain their memory and connection slots when no further setup arrives on the owning connection. Unpublish a logged-off session while the request reference keeps its response signing and encryption keys alive. Remove its procfs entry before dropping the table reference so a reader cannot remove its own entry on the last put. Clear proc_entry after removal to avoid removing it twice. Reclaim ended sessions from the global table in the existing expiration worker before it acquires conn_list_lock. Only select Expired sessions with zero credential expiry and no references beyond the table reference. Keep sessions whose Kerberos credentials expired available for reauthentication. Unlink the session from its setup connection and all channel connections, so SMB2 sessions and sessions with only secondary SMB3 channels are covered. The session already holds connection references, and sessions_table_lock prevents concurrent channel removal. Queue sessions on a separate disposal list, leaving their hash nodes unhashed, and remove procfs entries and drop table references outside the locks. Keep the pending setup check before allocating a new session so abandoned InProgress sessions can release their slots even at the connection limit. Retain the timeout and reference checks and dispose of those sessions outside the locks. Leave ended Expired sessions to the expiration worker.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.1% exploit odds No fix listed
  19. CVE-2026-100080

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-netback: Fix UAF when reading statistics data The network statistic data in the driver is protected by RCU. Unfortunately when tearing down the queues after an error during connecting to the frontend (e.g. due to illegal Xenstore data filled in by the guest), the statistic data is being freed without synchronizing the RCU state. In case the data is being read via sysfs in this phase, access to already freed memory or memory being in new use is possible. Fix that by calling synchronize_net() before freeing the queue data. This is XSA-526 / CVE-2026-100080

    Memory safety OS & kernel Linux

    unscored 0.3% exploit odds No fix listed
  20. CVE-2026-100082

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-blkback: Avoid UAF when reading I/O statistics Reading I/O statistics via sysfs concurrently with tearing down a frontend device might result in UAF or a NULL dereference, as the reading of the statistics data is not synchronized with freeing the data. Use a rwlock for synchronizing. This is XSA-528 / CVE-2026-100082

    Memory safety OS & kernel

    unscored 0.3% exploit odds No fix listed
  21. CVE-2026-99245

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: Fix key_reject_and_link() race with keyring restriction The restrict_link check in key_reject_and_link() is done before taking the keyring semaphore, racing with a concurrent keyring_restrict() that installs the restriction while holding the semaphore in write mode. Move the check to after __key_link_lock(), so it is done under the semaphore, matching the pattern used in __key_create_or_update().

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  22. CVE-2026-99256

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm cache: fix issue with background work locking dm cache used a rw_semaphore for background_work_lock. Write locks on rw_semaphores have strict owner semantics, but there was no guarantee that the process that locked background_work_lock was the same process that unlocked it. This can be easily seen using a kernel compiled with CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS. Given a dm cache device <cache>, run: 'dmsetup suspend <cache> && dmsetup resume <cache>'. This will trigger a kernel warning: DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)) triggered by cache_resume(). To fix this, switch from a rw_semaphore to a spinlock and a wait queue. dm cache already has a wait queue and associated counter, migration_wait and nr_allocated_migrations, that was getting woken up when background work was getting completed, but wasn't actually used by anything. This is replaced by the background_work queue and counter.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  23. CVE-2026-99254

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: don't flood a cancelling task with task_work io_ring_exit_work() asks each task which has used the ring to remove its tctx node, by task_work, and repeats that until the list is empty. io_tctx_exit_cb() doesn't touch the node while the task is in io_uring_cancel_generic(), which removes all the nodes at its end. So the work item queues the callback again as soon as it has completed, for nothing. That is more than a waste of time. task_work_run() only returns when it finds the list empty. If the rings are released from inside the cancellation, because requests of other rings held the last references to their files, up to 64 work items keep sending callbacks to the one task which is running them. It never finds the list empty, never gets back to the cancellation, the nodes stay, and so it goes on: a task with 60 pairs of rings which poll each other ran 280000 callbacks in 5 seconds, 20 seconds after exit_group(). It ends when all the senders happen to be late at the same time. Until then the task keeps a CPU and the work items busy. An exiting task can't be killed meanwhile. execve() cancels the requests in the same way, so a live task can get stuck there as well, for minutes. If it takes more than five, the work items run into the WARN_ON_ONCE(time_after(jiffies, timeout)) of io_ring_exit_work(). No privilege is needed for any of this. If the callback has met a task in cancellation, wait a little before it is sent again. Nobody has to wake the work item up for that: either the node is gone by then, or it is the turn of the next round.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  24. CVE-2026-99255

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: don't hide a link from cancellations A task that exits cancels its tracked requests and waits until they are gone. io_uring_cancel_generic() looks everywhere a request can be, and goes to sleep if it found nothing to cancel. It is woken up each time one of the requests of the task is completed by task work or freed. When io-wq is done with a request that has a link, there is a time in which the next request of the link can't be found: io_worker_handle_work() io_assign_current_work(worker, NULL) io_wq_free_work(work) io_req_find_next() // takes the link off the request io_free_req() // task work for the task io_assign_current_work(worker, linked) io_run_task_work() cond_resched() worker->cur_work = linked It is not pending, it is not the current work of a worker, and it is not yet on the list that it is about to be parked on. If the pass that the exiting task makes because of io_free_req() falls into that time, it finds nothing and the task goes to sleep. The worker then runs the link, which IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT doesn't prevent for bounded work. If that parks the request nothing is completed or freed, and nobody wakes up the task. If it is the process that exits it can't be killed any more either. NOP, IOSQE_ASYNC | IOSQE_IO_LINK FUTEX_WAIT, FUTEX2_PRIVATE exit of the thread, or of the process, up to 63us later With four of these per round 5 to 8 of 10,000 rounds hang (4 CPUs, KVM): io_uring_cancel_generic do_exit Commit f8b632e89a10 ("io_uring: tighten task exit cancellations") is about the same gap, and makes the task look again for whatever happens before io_free_req(). Free the request once the link is the current work of the worker, or pending. Whoever is woken up by that can find the link, until it is parked where cancellations look as well. To do so split io_wq_free_work() in two.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  25. CVE-2026-99244

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pid_namespace: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting the reaper Since commit 7fea700e04bd ("zap_pid_ns_processes: clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING") zap_pid_ns_processes() clears TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL before every kernel_wait4() call. Otherwise kernel_wait4() doesn't sleep and returns -ERESTARTSYS if signal_pending() is true and the reaper busy-waits. But clearing TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't fix it. It can get raised again. For example, klp_send_signals() sets it raw against any task that hasn't transitioned yet. And it keeps sending it until the livepatch finishes. The sleep loop waiting for pid_allocated to drop has the same problem and it doesn't even clear anything. So a schedule() in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE returns immediately. Use a no_notify_signal guard. signal_pending() will ignore TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and the pid namespace reaper sleeps until a child exits or free_pid() wakes it.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  26. CVE-2026-99258

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/hyperv: Avoid using per-cpu output page in hv_apicid_to_vp_index() hv_apicid_to_vp_index() currently uses the per-cpu hypercall input and output pages. This function is called when running in VTL2 and when running in an SEV-SNP CoCo VM with no paravisor. In the former case, the output page is allocated, but in the latter case it is not, so the hypervisor stores the output VP index in memory that has not been allocated by the guest. Fix this by using the input page for both input and output. The hypercall has very small input and output, so sharing the same page for both is straightforward. An alternative fix is to allocate the per-cpu output page when running in an SEV-SNP CoCo guest, but this uses significantly more memory, particularly with larger vCPUs counts.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  27. CVE-2026-99253

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/cancel: rearm local work wake up before sleep io_uring_try_cancel_requests() sets ->cq_wait_nr to 1 so that the next io_req_local_work_add() wakes the cancelling task. The add that takes the count to zero is the only one that wakes, later ones see a count <= 0 and return. io_uring_cancel_generic() however only becomes TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE much later, so the one wake up can be spent on a running task. That is fine as long as the entry of that add is still queued, as the io_local_work_pending() check then skips the sleep. It is not if the add was delayed after queueing its entry: CPU0 (submitter in exec or exit) CPU1 (io_req_local_work_add) mpscq_push(req A) io_uring_try_cancel_requests() io_run_local_work() // runs req A io_uring_try_cancel_requests() atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, 1) atomic_read(&ctx->cq_wait_nr) == 1 count taken, wake_up_state() // task is running, no-op prepare_to_wait(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE) io_local_work_pending() == false schedule() mpscq_push(req B) cq_wait_nr <= 0, return Only the sleeping task can run req B, so it is stuck in execve() until a signal happens to wake it. An exiting task doesn't even get that. Arm the count again once the task state is set and before the work list is checked, for the rings whose local work this task is the one to run.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  28. CVE-2026-99261

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: correct reservation fence slots for userq per-vm BOs eviction It fixes both the move overflow and the eviction fence add for evicting these per-vm BOs.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  29. CVE-2026-99257

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: shared: gracefully handle no-device lookup of shared GPIOs We use platform lookup tables for shared GPIOs. This mechanism needs a struct device to work so fwnode-based lookup with no device associated currently causes a NULL-pointer deference. Adding this functionality will require a larger rework and it has never worked anyway so add a check that allows the kernel to gracefully handle this situation with an error ahead of implementing that functionality as a new feature.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  30. CVE-2026-99259

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc/tegra: pmc: Fix uninitialised clock rate For legacy 32-bit Tegra devices, the warning in the tegra_pmc_enter_suspend_mode() function is being triggered because the early_pmc->rate variable is never configured and hence, always 0. This issue started occurring after updating the PMC driver to create the PMC context dynamically which causes the 'rate' to be set in the new dynamic context, but missed updating the rate in the early PMC context. Fix this by initialising the early_pmc->rate variable for 32-bit Tegra devices when the rate for the PMC context is initialised. [[email protected]: move assignment to existing #ifdef block]

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  31. CVE-2026-99260

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix resident conversion in ntfs_new_attr_flags When setting sparse/compressed flags on a resident attribute, the function skipped the resident-to-non-resident conversion and terminated.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  32. CVE-2026-99247

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Do not initialize tracefs work if tracing is disabled If trace buffer allocation fails during early boot (e.g. in early_trace_init() -> allocate_trace_buffers()), tracing_disabled is left set to 1 and the global trace array events list remains uninitialized. Later during boot, tracer_init_tracefs() (invoked via fs_initcall) queues tracerfs_init_work asynchronously without checking if tracing was disabled. When tracer_init_tracefs_work_func() runs, it calls event_trace_init() and init_tracer_tracefs(&global_trace, NULL) unconditionally. This leads to __find_event_file() dereferencing an uninitialized tr->events list, causing an early boot NULL pointer dereference Oops: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000010 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000485be0 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1] ... NIP [c000000000485be0] __find_event_file+0x70/0x3c0 LR [c000000000448874] init_tracer_tracefs+0x274/0xc80 Call Trace: init_tracer_tracefs+0x274/0xc80 tracer_init_tracefs_work_func+0x50/0x320 process_one_work+0x1e8/0x5c0 worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3d0 kthread+0x194/0x1b0 start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18 Check tracing_disabled at the beginning of tracer_init_tracefs_work_func() and return immediately if tracing is disabled or failed to initialize, preventing the crash.

    Denial of service OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  33. CVE-2026-99249

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every suspend attempt fails: Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt and the task spins until the wait ends. Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does. This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does not reap those killed during the dump.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  34. CVE-2026-99251

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: Avoid infinite retry loop in init_vp_index() There is a retry loop in init_vp_index() where the CPUs from a certain node are stripped out if they have already been in the allocated cpumask or not in HK_TYPE_MANAGED_IRQ housekeeping cpumask. If there is no CPU left, the allocated cpumask is ignored and the process is retried again. However, if the HK_TYPE_MANAGED_IRQ housekeeping cpumask turns out not to contain any CPU in that particular node, that will become an infinite retry loop. This particular problem was reported by sashiko [1]. This should rarely happen, but we still need to guard against this. Fix this infinite loop problem by also skipping NUMA node that has no housekeeping CPU in the inner while loop of init_vp_index(). Also update the early abort check to check for the absence of online housekeeping CPUs instead of just the emptiness of the cpumask. As the outer for loop will only be reached if the housekeeping cpumask has at least one online CPU, a NUMA node with housekeeping CPUs will eventually be found.

    Denial of service OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  35. CVE-2026-99250

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: printk: Postpone kthread startup There have been various bug reports related to SMP systems hanging on boot. The reports vary but seem to have some overlap with regard to missed IPI's during SMP setup. The reports also show that reverting NBCON console usage allows the bugs to disappear. The NBCON kthreads for console printing are started very early during boot using early_initcall(). Since these kthreads are asynchronously enabling/disabling interrupts during early boot, they may be interfering with early SMP setup on some hardware platforms. Starting the console printing kthreads later has shown to avoid the hanging on systems that could previously reproduce the issue. Postpone kthread starting until after all arch initcalls have completed.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  36. CVE-2026-99248

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: xiic: restore non-managed runtime PM to fix clk WARN flood The devres conversion replaced manual pm_runtime_enable()/disable() with devm_pm_runtime_set_active_enabled() and dropped the remove-time runtime PM teardown. The managed release tears runtime PM down in the wrong order: it calls pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend() before pm_runtime_disable(), i.e. while runtime PM is still enabled, and devres is LIFO so the devm_clk_get_enabled() release runs afterwards. At remove(), pm_runtime_put_sync() leaves the device active with the autosuspend timer armed. Clearing use_autosuspend then makes rpm_idle() suspend immediately, and xiic_i2c_runtime_suspend() clk_disable()s the clock. The later devm_clk_get_enabled() release clk_disable_unprepare()s the already-disabled clock, so clk_core_disable() WARNs ("clkN already disabled") on every teardown. Drop the managed helper and restore the non-managed runtime PM setup and teardown, so runtime PM is enabled once in probe and disabled once in remove and the clock enable count stays balanced. Order the remove teardown so runtime PM is disabled before the usage count is dropped: pm_runtime_disable() followed by pm_runtime_put_noidle() instead of pm_runtime_put_sync(). Dropping the count first with autosuspend still enabled arms the autosuspend timer, and a preemption before pm_runtime_disable() lets it expire, suspend the device and clk_disable() the clock, which the devm release then disables again - the same WARN. Restore the non-managed IRQ request as well. The probe error paths now unwind runtime PM by hand via goto, and a devm-registered handler is only freed later during devres unwind, so it would stay live across the manual teardown (and across any future failing step added after it). Request the IRQ with request_threaded_irq() and free it explicitly in the probe error path and in remove. The probe error path also clears use_autosuspend, to match the teardown in remove().

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.1% exploit odds No fix listed
  37. CVE-2026-99234

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Unregister field variable histograms when the command fails An action that names a field on another event needs that field as a variable, so create_field_var_hist() registers a second hist trigger on that event to provide it, and records it in target_hist_data->field_var_hists[]. If a later part of the same command fails, create_actions() returns an error and event_hist_trigger_parse() jumps to out_free. The write fails with -EINVAL and sched_switch gets no trigger, but: # echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs' >> \ events/sched/sched_waking/trigger # echo 'my_synth u64 lat; int a; int b' >> synthetic_events # echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:wakeup_lat=common_timestamp.usecs-$ts0:\ onmatch(sched.sched_waking).my_synth($wakeup_lat,prio,nosuchfld)'\ >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger # cat events/sched/sched_waking/trigger hist:keys=pid:vals=hitcount:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs:sort=hitcount:size=2048:clock=global [active] hist:keys=pid:vals=hitcount:synthetic_prio=prio:sort=hitcount:size=2048 [active] The second histogram is the one created for 'prio'. It is still active and still counting. out_free reaches destroy_field_var_hists(), which frees the field_var_hists[] entries, but never unregister_field_var_hists(), which is what removes the triggers and runs only from event_hist_trigger_free(). The entry is freed and the trigger is left with nothing tracking it. Unregister the field variable histograms in out_free as well, and record each one as soon as its trigger is registered rather than after the lookup that follows it, so no exit can leave a registered trigger untracked. The entry then belongs to field_var_hists[] and is released by destroy_field_var_hists(), so freeing it on that exit would be a double free.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  38. CVE-2026-99225

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: Check the authorization payload in process keyring searches An authorization payload and its saved credentials must remain valid while search_process_keyrings_rcu() searches the requestor's keyrings. The function validates the authorization key, then separately loads payload.data[0] and unconditionally reads rka->cred. Validation does not prevent request_key_auth_revoke() from clearing the payload. A request-key helper can assume authority and fork a descendant that inherits the authorization key. If the descendant misses in its own keyrings, it falls back to the saved requestor credentials. Successful target instantiation invalidates the authorization key without clearing the payload. After the helper exits, UMH_WAIT_PROC returns to the requester, which calls complete_request_key() and revokes that key. With the descendant paused after validation, the paths can interleave as follows: 1. The descendant enters search_process_keyrings_rcu() under RCU and key_validate() succeeds. 2. The helper instantiates the target, invalidates the authorization key, and exits. 3. The requester resumes from UMH_WAIT_PROC, calls complete_request_key(), and revokes the authorization key. request_key_auth_revoke() sets its payload pointer to NULL. 4. The descendant loads NULL and dereferences rka->cred. This NULL dereference can oops the kernel. RCU delays payload disposal but does not prevent the pointer from being cleared. Load the payload with dereference_key_rcu() and require a non-NULL result before validating the authorization key and searching its saved credentials. A non-NULL payload and its credentials remain alive for the caller's RCU read-side section; a cleared payload skips the fallback search and follows the existing error selection. KASAN report as below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] RIP: 0010:search_process_keyrings_rcu+0x32b/0x790

    Auth & access OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  39. CVE-2026-99226

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID alive through the namespace mapping check. find_keyring_by_name() reads keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user. A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on another CPU. If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is possible: Named join Chown find_keyring_by_name() keyctl_chown_key() read_lock(keyring_name_lock) down_write(key->sem) load old keyring->user replace key->user and key->uid up_write(key->sem) key_put(key) key_user_put(old user): free read old user->uid read_unlock(keyring_name_lock) Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read. The lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive. Use keyring->uid for the mapping check. key_alloc() initializes this inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown. The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime. This also matches the owner UID used by the permission check. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  40. CVE-2026-99222

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: Protect the read method check against type removal keyctl_read_key() checks key->type->read without holding key->sem. A reference keeps the key alive, but does not pin the module containing its type. A surviving RxRPC key can therefore be read while AF_RXRPC is being unloaded: KEYCTL_READ task Module unload and key GC ---------------- ------------------------ lookup_user_key() permission / possession checks load key->type af_rxrpc_exit() unregister_key_type() GC: down_write(key->sem) GC: retype to key_type_dead GC: up_write(key->sem) unregister_key_type() returns free_module() read saved type's read member The final access can read freed module storage. The read invocation in __keyctl_read_key() is already protected by key->sem, but the earlier method check is outside that critical section. Move the method check into __keyctl_read_key(), after key_validate() and under its existing read hold on key->sem. The check and invocation then use the same protected type for length queries and every read retry. The GC cannot retype the key until the semaphore is released, and type unregistration waits for that GC pass before the module can be freed. Return -EOPNOTSUPP when validation succeeds and the type has no read method. A temporary buffer may now be allocated before this result; allocation and copying to userspace remain outside the semaphore.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  41. CVE-2026-99223

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array traversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address. On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to distinguish the candidate slides. Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word. Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and the description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in the later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a differing index bit. Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered. Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent, and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search. The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged; only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  42. CVE-2026-99221

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure trusted_tpm_unseal() proceeds to pcrlock() when the TPM unseal operation fails. If pcrlock() succeeds, its return value overwrites the unseal error, causing key instantiation to succeed. Return immediately when unseal fails to preserve the original error.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  43. CVE-2026-99219

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Initialize modname and offset in print_rec() print_rec() leaves 'modname' and 'offset' uninitialized and kallsyms_lookup() only sets them on success. When the lookup fails like when a module is being loaded or unloaded, 'modname' holds a garbage value, passes the 'if (modname)' check, and is dereferenced by seq_printf(). Oops: general protection fault RIP: 0010:string+0x48/0xe0 Call Trace: vsnprintf+0x1f5/0x650 seq_printf+0x8e/0xb0 print_rec+0x6c/0xc0 t_show+0x4c/0x440 seq_read_iter+0x119/0x480 This can be triggered by reading available_filter_functions while a module is being loaded or unloaded. Initialize both variables so a failed lookup skips the module name.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  44. CVE-2026-99228

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: don't lose the signal that ends work When a thread exits, only its tracked requests are cancelled. Then its io-wq is torn down. io_wq_exit_workers() signals every worker, to get it out of an interruptible sleep, and waits for all of them to exit. Before they do, they go through the work that is left. Unbounded work is cancelled. Bounded work is run, as it is expected to end by itself. Not all of it does. An open has no file yet, so it counts as bounded, and the open of a FIFO waits for the other end. That is what the signal is for. But the workers are signalled once, and a worker that hasn't started the work by then loses the signal: io_wq_exit_workers() io_worker_handle_work() io_wq_worker_wake() set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL io_assign_current_work() io_run_task_work() clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL io_wq_submit_work() fifo_open() wait_for_partner() wait_for_completion_timeout() The thread never gets out of do_exit(): IORING_OP_OPENAT of a FIFO without a writer, IOSQE_ASYNC exit of the thread that has submitted it hangs in more than 9 of 10 attempts (4 CPUs, KVM), until the process is killed. Set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL for bounded work that is started with IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT set. The bit is set before the workers are signalled, and it is tested after the flag has been cleared, with clear_notify_signal() providing the barrier. So either the flag stays, or the bit is seen. Work that is started while the io-wq exits is treated like work that is being run at that time: it isn't interrupted unless it waits interruptibly.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  45. CVE-2026-99229

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/wait: don't spin on a stuck overflow list As long as IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT is set, io_cqring_wait_schedule() returns right away, before it gets to look at signals or arms the timeout, for io_cqring_wait() to flush the overflow list. If that doesn't empty the list, and the CQ ring doesn't hold the number of events the caller wants, the loop starts over, with the same result. The task spins in the kernel, and can't be killed. The assumption is that this can't happen: if CQEs can't be flushed, the ring is full, and min_events is capped to the size of the ring. But: - With IORING_SETUP_CQE_MIXED a 32b CQE needs two contiguous entries. It is stuck on the list if a single one is free, and then the ring holds less than cq_entries events. A single threaded application that asks for as many events as the ring has entries never gets out of io_uring_enter(). - Whether the ring is full is up to the CQ head, which the application can write to. While one thread waits for events on an empty ring, another one can move the head back so that the ring looks full and have a CQE overflow. The waiter can't be stopped any more, not even by SIGKILL. Only the application can make room in the CQ ring. Return to it if the list could not be flushed.

    Denial of service OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  46. CVE-2026-99240

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: error damos_commit_quota_goal() for zero target_value Patch series "mm/damon: move zero damos quota target_value handling to the core layer". Having zero DAMOS quota target value can cause division by zero. DAMON API callers are checking the target value parameters to avoid that. It is easy to make mistakes in some of the multiple API callers. Move that to the core layer. Patch 1 adds the corner case handling into the core layer DAMON parameters validation logic. Patches 2 and 3 remove no more needed DAMON API callers side handling of the corner case in DAMON_LRU_SORT and DMON_SAMPLIE_MTIER, respectively. This patch (of 3): If a DAMOS scheme has a damos_quota_goal of zero target_value, damos_quota_goal() could trigger division-by-zero error. Hence each DAMON API callers should do the zero target_value validation. It is easy to make mistakes. Actually such bugs in DAMON_LRU_SORT and DAMON_SAMPLE_MTIER were found and fixed [1]. It is better to handle the corner case only once in the core layer, instead of multiple places in all DAMON API callers. One straightforward option is using an alternative denominator for the corner case in the damos_quota_goal(). However, the zero target_value is meaningless. In this case, the quota goal is always evaluated as achieved or over-achieved. The quota will only keep being reduced. Simply avoid using zero target_value by adding a check in the core layer DAMOS quota goal parameters validation/commit path, damos_commit_quota_goal(). Update it to return an error in the case. Also update its caller to propagate the error.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  47. CVE-2026-99230

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/cmd: don't leave list poison in ->hash_node io_uring_cmd_del_cancelable() uses hlist_del() to take a command off ->cancelable_uring_cmd, which leaves LIST_POISON1/2 behind in ->hash_node. Requests are recycled through the request cache without being reinitialised, and not every user of ->hash_node sets it up before it is used: If a vectored futex wait is woken while futex_wait_multiple_setup() is still queueing the futexes, io_futexv_wait() doesn't add the request to ->futex_list, and leaves the completion to the task_work queued by the wake up. io_futexv_complete() ends in __io_futex_complete(), whose hlist_del_init() is fine for a request that is unhashed, which is how all other users of the node leave it. If the request was a cancelable uring_cmd in its previous life, e.g. a ublk FETCH_REQ, it writes through LIST_POISON2: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-...] RIP: 0010:io_futexv_complete+0x219/0x420 Call Trace: tctx_task_work_run+0x804/0x950 tctx_task_work+0x71/0xa0 task_work_run+0x118/0x200 Leave the node unhashed.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  48. CVE-2026-99232

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/syscalls: Use copy_from_user for the faultable syscall buffer syscall_copy_user_array() copies the buffer argument of faultable syscalls (write, pwrite64, ...) with __copy_from_user(), which skips access_ok(). Use copy_from_user() instead so a non-user address is rejected and the entry is recorded as faulted. It could be a security concern for machines that trust perf a bit too much.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  49. CVE-2026-99241

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: take invalidate_lock in ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() calls iomap_page_mkwrite() without holding mapping->invalidate_lock, so a concurrent truncate or fallocate can be in the middle of invalidating pagecache and rewriting the runlist while the write fault maps blocks and dirties the folio. This races with ntfs_attr_fallocate(), which merges clusters into the in-memory runlist, drops the runlist lock, and only afterwards zeroes the newly allocated clusters on disk; and with the punch-hole/insert/collapse paths that free clusters after truncating the cache. Per Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst, ->page_mkwrite() must ensure there are no truncate/invalidate races, "usually mapping->invalidate_lock is suitable for proper serialization". xfs takes its mmaplock (= the invalidate_lock rwsem) shared in exactly this path. Take invalidate_lock shared around iomap_page_mkwrite(). The read-only fault path is already covered because filemap_fault() itself grabs invalidate_lock shared on instantiation/read paths; only page_mkwrite was bypassing it in this driver.

    Other OS & kernel

    unscored 0.2% exploit odds No fix listed
  50. CVE-2026-99242

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix race between fallocate and mmap reads The fallocate implementation only takes invalidate_lock for punch hole, collapse range, and insert range operations. For standard allocation modes (mode == 0, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE), the lock is not held. During ntfs_attr_fallocate(), new clusters are mapped to the runlist via ntfs_attr_map_cluster() before being zeroed by ntfs_dio_zero_range(). This creates a window where concurrent mmap page faults can read uninitialized disk data. Since mmap uses filemap_fault() which takes invalidate_lock in shared mode, it can fault in pages during this window and expose old disk contents to userspace. This is an information leak and data integrity issue. Fix by taking invalidate_lock for all fallocate operations, not just for punch/collapse/insert modes. This prevents concurrent page faults from accessing unzeroed clusters during the allocation window.

    Disclosure OS & kernel

    unscored 0.1% exploit odds No fix listed

CVEs for which no patch, fixed version or vendor advisory is linked in the CVE.org or NVD record. Treat these as exposed until the vendor says otherwise.