CVE-2026-98613
What it is
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Bound ownership depth through local kptrs and graph roots Program-allocated objects can own other local objects through referenced kptrs. bpf_obj_free_fields() follows those pointers through __bpf_obj_drop_impl() synchronously, before the object storage is freed through RCU. A self-referential local kptr type therefore permits arbitrarily deep object chains, and dropping the head can exhaust the kernel stack. Long acyclic type chains have the same problem. btf_check_and_fixup_fields() still assumes referenced kptrs only point to kernel types and checks ownership through list and rbtree roots only. Its existing rule is sufficient for graph-only cycles: the target of each graph edge must contain a node, so every type in a cycle has both a root and a node. The rule rejects such a type owning another root, breaking every cycle. It also limits graph-only chains to three types, or two if the first type contains a node, and conservatively rejects longer acyclic chains. The missing local-kptr edges, rather than a missed graph-only cycle, are the bug introduced by support for bpf_kptr_xchg() into local kptrs. Replace that restriction with one bounded ownership walk covering graph roots and local referenced kptrs. Run it after all BTF records have been fixed up, reject cycles and paths deeper than eight record-bearing types, and cache each type's suffix depth while checking it against the remaining budget. This also permits the longer acyclic graph-only layouts rejected by the old rule; update their existing BTF tests accordingly. Keep the bound independent of MAX_CALL_FRAMES because recursive destruction can run below a BPF call chain. A plain local pointee without special-field metadata adds only a final non-recursing drop. Non-owning kptrs and kernel-BTF kptrs do not recurse through local records and remain outside the walk. Include local percpu-kptr edges too, although allocation of percpu objects with special fields is currently forbidden, so that relaxing that restriction cannot bypass the ownership bound. btf_check_and_fixup_fields() continues to initialize graph_root.value_rec, including for separately allocated map records. The ownership relationships belong to immutable program BTF and only need validation at BTF load time.
At a glance
- Exploit odds
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- No patch or advisory is linked yet. Look at mitigations or restrict exposure.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: not scored yet.
- Fix: none linked yet, which raises it.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Record status
- Received
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