CVE-2026-97055

What it is

SigNoz from v0.8.0 before v0.143.0 defaults the JWT tokenizer signing secret (tokenizer::jwt::secret, set via SIGNOZ_TOKENIZER_JWT_SECRET or the deprecated SIGNOZ_JWT_SECRET) to an empty string, and Config.Validate() does not reject the empty value, so a deployment that does not configure a secret starts up and both signs and verifies session tokens with an empty HMAC key. Because the JWT tokenizer was the default provider, any such deployment is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the ID of an existing user can forge a valid session token for that user — including an administrator — by signing the id, orgId and email claims with an empty key; the organization ID (and whether an email is registered) can be obtained without authentication from /api/v2/sessions/context. A forged refresh token can be exchanged at /api/v2/sessions/rotate for a new token pair and cannot be revoked, so it remains usable for its full lifetime (30 days by default). Fixed in v0.143.0, which requires a JWT secret when the jwt provider is selected and changes the default provider to opaque.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network without logging in. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.

Exploit odds

0.5% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-09-24 02:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-09-24 21:08 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-09-24 02:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-09-24 21:08 UTC

Exploit probability

0.5% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-1188

Record status

Deferred

Attack profile CVSS 4.0 · 9.2

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Attack requirements

Present

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High