CVE-2026-95823
What it is
tcp_pkt_linearize() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c is used by th_get() whenever a received TCP header is not contiguous in a single net_buf. While pulling the header bytes out of the following fragments, the loop called net_buf_unref() on an emptied fragment without first detaching its frags pointer. net_buf_unref() walks the whole fragment list, so the payload buffers still linked behind that fragment were freed as well, and the stale pointer was then reinstalled into the packet as buf->frags, producing a use-after-free and a later double free during packet teardown. The same loop also advanced to second->frags unconditionally: when the fragment still held payload after the header remainder was pulled, it was spliced out of the packet without ever being unreferenced, permanently leaking that buffer and silently dropping the data it carried. The defect is reached from tcp_recv() via th_get() on every received TCP segment, before connection lookup or any header validation, so a single unauthenticated segment that matches a listening socket is sufficient. An attacker only needs the TCP header to straddle a net_buf boundary, which they can arrange from off-link: IPv6 extension headers are accepted on receive and their length is added to the header offset by th_get(), so a Destination Options header of a suitable length places the TCP header across the boundary of the fixed-size receive buffers (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE). Packet chains assembled from several sources - IPv4/IPv6 reassembly, 6LoWPAN/802.15.4 reassembly, tunnel or virtual interfaces that strip an outer header, or drivers producing scatter-gather chains - can additionally present a short interior fragment that the loop empties exactly, which is the case that frees the remainder of the packet while it is still in use. The reliably reachable consequence is exhaustion of the receive buffer pool: each crafted segment leaks one net_buf from the fixed CONFIG_NET_BUF_RX_COUNT pool, the buffers are never reclaimed, and once the pool is empty the device can no longer receive network traffic until it is rebooted. Where a fragment is emptied exactly, the impact rises to memory corruption: freed pool buffers are written through by the remainder of the loop, their contents may be delivered to the application, and the packet is double-freed on teardown. The fix saves and clears second->frags before the net_buf_unref() so only the emptied header fragment is released, and advances to the next fragment only when second->len == 0, keeping any fragment that still holds payload in the packet. This restores the detach-before-unref ownership pattern used elsewhere in the stack, for example in net_pkt_trim_buffer().
At a glance
- Exploitability
- Can be exploited over the network without logging in. High risk of service disruption.
- Fix
- A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.
Timeline
- ReservedThe CVE id was reserved by its CNA
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: not scored yet.
- Severity: 7.5 HIGH (CVSS).
- Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Weakness
- CWE-416 · Use after free
- Record status
- Awaiting Analysis
Affected
- Zephyrproject Zephyr < 4.3.2
- Zephyrproject Zephyr < 4.5.0
Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 7.5
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-95823.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-95823. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
Fix and advisories
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c66e7c6cc0c01492a423fa94fa0e5005308799b6
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-5g8m-jj22-82f5