CVE-2026-9277

What it is

shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; any other object shape throws `TypeError`.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network without logging in. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.

Exploit odds

0.8% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-05-22 14:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-09-14 13:19 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-05-22 14:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-09-14 13:19 UTC

Exploit probability

0.8% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-77 · Command injection

Record status

Deferred

Attack profile CVSS 4.0 · 9.2

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Attack requirements

Present

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High