CVE-2026-90107
What it is
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: free pending qentry in smc_llc_flow_stop() before memset smc_llc_flow_stop() resets a flow struct with a blind memset: spin_lock_bh(&lgr->llc_flow_lock); memset(flow, 0, sizeof(*flow)); flow->type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_NONE; spin_unlock_bh(&lgr->llc_flow_lock); If flow->qentry is non-NULL at this point the pointer is overwritten without the allocation being freed, leaking one kmalloc object. A late-arriving duplicate CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT message can set flow->qentry after the legitimate message has been consumed by the waiter via smc_llc_flow_qentry_clr() (which NULLs the pointer but leaves flow->type non-zero) but before the flow completes and smc_llc_flow_stop() runs. In that window the duplicate is stashed into flow->qentry, and then lost when smc_llc_flow_stop() zeros the struct. Call smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() inside the lock before the memset. smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow->qentry before freeing, so the normal case where no entry is pending is a no-op.
At a glance
- Exploit odds
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- No patch or advisory is linked yet. Look at mitigations or restrict exposure.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: not scored yet.
- Fix: none linked yet, which raises it.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Record status
- Received
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-90107.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-90107. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/032aec7d03c9102616b98fea74f8f7145e7f867c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0879ea157acc1ac6752f6fcb755d1f91a2359238
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11bc373ee6630709f0c2da2e7860c23d503c9e9d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ee0ceddc7785c6dcf4a8107fef01f0414a354f4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ff429dd6725fa6c1e17a4ed0be8ab675f67a98b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e3deb150a5237b672c4579e69a6deb02027dbed
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/957dba2b8b5aebfe09caa6a6b22b958079082eab
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f03aa5d36ae3c4068a1c3885146be99aa7fd9307