CVE-2026-90053

What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching to cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic from a single packet. Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this qdisc or its parent. The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced: htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal root -> inner -> leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not affect legitimate classification. htb_classify() can now return NULL irrespective of CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, whereas previously every NULL return sat inside that ifdef. The NULL handler in htb_enqueue() therefore cannot stay conditional either, so drop the ifdef around it. This matches hfsc_enqueue(), which has always handled a NULL class unconditionally. Without it, a kernel built without actions would dereference a NULL class instead of dropping. Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB, CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32, CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR. - Create an HTB qdisc on a device (e.g. lo), add an inner class 1:1 with a leaf child 1:10, install a root u32 filter selecting 1:1, and an inner-class u32 filter on 1:1 also selecting 1:1. - Send one packet (ping). On the unfixed kernel the classify loop spins with the qdisc lock held; with softlockup_panic=1 it panics. - Reachable from unprivileged user via unshare -Urn (CAP_NET_ADMIN).

At a glance

Exploit odds

0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

No patch or advisory is linked yet. Look at mitigations or restrict exposure.

Timeline

1. 2026-09-17 17:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-10-19 09:18 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Why it ranks here

• Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
• Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
• Severity: not scored yet.
• Fix: none linked yet, which raises it.

Details

Published

2026-09-17 17:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-10-19 09:18 UTC

Exploit probability

0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days

Record status

Received

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