CVE-2026-89864
What it is
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed 64-byte buffer: struct qla_i2c_access { uint16_t device, offset, option, length; uint8_t buffer[0x40]; } __packed; qla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied i2c->length without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte on-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to 65535 overruns both: - write: memcpy(sfp, i2c->buffer, i2c->length) over-reads the stack and over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs i2c->length bytes out of the 256-byte buffer. - read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c->length bytes into the 256-byte sfp, then memcpy(i2c->buffer, sfp, i2c->length) overflows the 64-byte buffer inside the on-stack array. A caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the kernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any copy or DMA transfer in both handlers.
At a glance
- Exploit odds
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- No patch or advisory is linked yet. Look at mitigations or restrict exposure.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: not scored yet.
- Fix: none linked yet, which raises it.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Record status
- Received
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-89864.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-89864. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0918ee2c0eeb4d7f45b82b3dc11e65c2d9b7ad59
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2be39946abcde5a6416fb074ef728429e246a996
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32d6df14fdab71fe1ba304fd9a0db0411ea2e043
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47049fdadc0eaa115e813735b827e1379c0d2cf8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/522d6dcdc645d8f97d6b4cdfd6d8eea307f3ff0e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f01f886cc5e7bbc16cbf1a9928fdebbc911e973
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97ca58b0fb026799b99e3d552d5f69cf9a3113ad
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a756f277eb89f769dbf380f38245c270d31fdb5