CVE-2026-82389

What it is

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed. The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment. When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available. Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited from the same network segment without logging in. High risk of service disruption.

Exploit odds

0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-08-28 21:11 UTC ReservedThe CVE id was reserved by its CNA
2. 2026-10-26 17:17 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
3. 2026-10-26 18:34 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Why it ranks here

• Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
• Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
• Severity: 6.5 MEDIUM (CVSS).
• Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.

Details

Published

2026-10-26 17:17 UTC

Last modified

2026-10-26 18:34 UTC

Exploit probability

0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-476 · NULL pointer dereference

Record status

Awaiting Analysis

Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 6.5

Attack vector

Adjacent network

Complexity

Low

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

None

Availability

High

Is it in your code?

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