CVE-2026-81098

What it is

The Telnyx MCP server exposed its HTTP transport on every interface and did not require a caller credential. packages/mcp-server/src/http.ts served MCP on the root path with a listener bound to all interfaces and parsed the caller's authentication headers in a mode that did not fail when they were absent, so a request without any credential completed initialisation and dispatched tools. Dispatch forwarded the server's own stored credentials, the Telnyx API key and client secret together with the code-execution key, to the upstream endpoint, so an unauthenticated caller able to reach the port acted with them. The current code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network without logging in. High risk of data exposure, data tampering.

Exploit odds

0.7% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-08-27 17:20 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-09-24 20:43 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-08-27 17:20 UTC

Last modified

2026-09-24 20:43 UTC

Exploit probability

0.7% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-306 · Missing authentication

Record status

Deferred

Attack profile CVSS 4.0 · 9.3

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Attack requirements

None

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

None