CVE-2026-72222

What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt() calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking svsk->sk_handshake_done. The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry. Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509() so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all(). [cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change]

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network without logging in. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.

Exploit odds

0.6% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

No patch or advisory is linked yet. Look at mitigations or restrict exposure.

Timeline

1. 2026-08-09 03:40 UTC ReservedThe CVE id was reserved by its CNA
2. 2026-08-15 06:21 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
3. 2026-10-16 19:17 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Why it ranks here

• Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
• Exploit odds: 0.6% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
• Severity: 9.8 CRITICAL (CVSS).
• Fix: none linked yet, which raises it.

Details

Published

2026-08-15 06:21 UTC

Last modified

2026-10-16 19:17 UTC

Exploit probability

0.6% · EPSS, next 30 days

Record status

Received

Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 9.8

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Is it in your code?

Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.

Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-72222.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-72222. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.

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