CVE-2026-55165

What it is

Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.2, the JWT verifier in lemur/auth/service.py:130-137 used fetch_token_header to read header_data["alg"] from an unverified token and passed that attacker-controlled value to decode_with_multiple_secrets. PyJWT 2.x rejects alg=none with the configured key, so the flaw is a defense-in-depth gap rather than a direct authentication bypass in the shipped configuration. The unpinned algorithm can become exploitable after an asymmetric-signing migration through algorithm confusion, and it weakens algorithm-based anomaly detection because the token chooses the recorded value. A separate disclosure of LEMUR_TOKEN_SECRET would also permit forged HS256 tokens, although that disclosure is an independent prerequisite. The fix introduces the server-controlled LEMUR_TOKEN_ALGORITHMS allowlist and defaults it to HS256. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.2.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network without logging in. Limited direct impact.

Exploit odds

0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-08-18 19:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-09-08 21:02 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-08-18 19:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-09-08 21:02 UTC

Exploit probability

0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-347

Record status

Deferred

Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 4.8

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

High

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

Low

Availability

None