CVE-2026-5446

What it is

In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter, and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network with a low-privilege account. High risk of data exposure.

Exploit odds

0.3% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-04-09 21:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-06-17 10:59 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-04-09 21:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-06-17 10:59 UTC

Exploit probability

0.3% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-323

Record status

Analyzed

Affected

• Wolfssl < 5.9.1

Attack profile CVSS 4.0 · 6.0

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Attack requirements

Present

Privileges needed

Low

User interaction

None

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

Low

Availability

None