CVE-2026-53604

What it is

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network with a low-privilege account. High risk of data exposure.

Exploit odds

0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-09-04 20:17 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-09-08 21:05 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-09-04 20:17 UTC

Last modified

2026-09-08 21:05 UTC

Exploit probability

0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-212

Record status

Deferred

Attack profile CVSS 4.0 · 7.1

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Attack requirements

None

Privileges needed

Low

User interaction

None

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

None

Availability

None