CVE-2026-46275
What it is
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths Vulnerabilities leading to Use-After-Free (UAF) and Null Pointer Dereference (NPD) conditions were observed in the lifecycle management of hci_uart. The primary issue arises because the workqueues (init_ready and write_work) are only flushed/cancelled if the HCI_UART_PROTO_READY flag is set during TTY close. If a hangup occurs before setup completes, hci_uart_tty_close() skips the teardown of these workqueues and proceeds to free the `hu` struct. When the scheduled work executes later, it blindly dereferences the freed `hu` struct. Furthermore, several data races and UAFs were identified in the teardown sequence: 1. Calling hci_uart_flush() from hci_uart_close() without effectively disabling write_work causes a race condition where both can concurrently double-free hu->tx_skb. This happens because protocol timers can concurrently invoke hci_uart_tx_wakeup() and requeue write_work. 2. Calling hci_free_dev(hdev) before hu->proto->close(hu) causes a UAF when vendor specific protocol close callbacks dereference hu->hdev. 3. In the initialization error paths, failing to take the proto_lock write lock before clearing PROTO_READY leads to races with active readers. Additionally, hci_uart_tty_receive() accesses hu->hdev outside the read lock, leading to UAFs if the initialization error path frees hdev concurrently. Fix these synchronization and lifecycle issues by: 1. Re-ordering hci_uart_tty_close() to clear HCI_UART_PROTO_READY first, followed immediately by a cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work). Clearing the flag locks out concurrent protocol timers from successfully invoking hci_uart_tx_wakeup(), effectively rendering the cancellation permanent and preventing the tx_skb double-free. 2. Note: Clearing PROTO_READY early causes hci_uart_close() to skip hu->proto->flush(). This is perfectly safe in the tty_close path because hu->proto->close() executes shortly after, which intrinsically purges all protocol SKB queues and tears down the state. 3. Relocating hu->proto->close(hu) strictly prior to hci_free_dev(hdev) across all close and error paths to prevent vendor-level UAFs. 4. Moving the hdev->stat.byte_rx increment in hci_uart_tty_receive() inside the proto_lock read-side critical section to safely synchronize with device unregistration. 5. Adding cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work) to hci_uart_close() to safely flush the workqueue before hci_uart_flush() is invoked via the HCI core. 6. Utilizing cancel_work_sync() instead of disable_work_sync() across all paths to prevent permanently breaking user-space retry capabilities.
At a glance
- Exploitability
- Can be exploited locally on the machine with a low-privilege account. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.
- Exploit odds
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: 7.8 HIGH (CVSS).
- Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Weakness
- CWE-362 · Race condition
- Record status
- Modified
Affected
- Linux Kernel < 4.15
- Linux Kernel < 4.20
- Linux Kernel < 5.5
- Linux Kernel < 5.9
- Linux Kernel < 5.10.258
- Linux Kernel < 5.15.209
- Linux Kernel < 6.1.175
- Linux Kernel < 6.6.142
Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 7.8
- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-46275.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-46275. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
Fix and advisories
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/192cb0f1ca706d9a1bc36ae0ad5f666d1e4fd894
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7338031946bd06f6dff149e67b60c4cd083bfea8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78aad93e938f013d9272fe0ee168f27883afa95c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81c7a3c22a0f2808cf4ae0b4908f59763b23606d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d20d48be2c4a071fb015eb09bda2cecd25daf34
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1bb9336ae6b54a5f6a353c4bd4ed9a4307e429b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c85cff648a2bc92322912db5f1727ad05afae7b6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/192cb0f1ca706d9a1bc36ae0ad5f666d1e4fd894
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7338031946bd06f6dff149e67b60c4cd083bfea8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78aad93e938f013d9272fe0ee168f27883afa95c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81c7a3c22a0f2808cf4ae0b4908f59763b23606d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d20d48be2c4a071fb015eb09bda2cecd25daf34
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1bb9336ae6b54a5f6a353c4bd4ed9a4307e429b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c85cff648a2bc92322912db5f1727ad05afae7b6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html