CVE-2026-46242

What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited locally on the machine with a low-privilege account. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.

Exploit odds

4.6% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-05-30 13:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-10-19 20:18 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Why it ranks here

• Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
• Exploit odds: 4.6% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
• Severity: 7.8 HIGH (CVSS).
• Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.

Details

Published

2026-05-30 13:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-10-19 20:18 UTC

Exploit probability

4.6% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-416 · Use after free

Record status

Modified

Affected

• Linux Kernel < 5.16
• Linux Kernel < 6.2
• Linux Kernel < 6.18.33
• Linux Kernel < 7.0.10

Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 7.8

Attack vector

Local

Complexity

Low

Privileges needed

Low

User interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Is it in your code?

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