CVE-2026-31667
What it is
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5 controller): ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths: 1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() -> uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex. 2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires input_mutex. 3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires dev->mutex. 4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex. Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock (ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes. To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock. Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated, uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the request becomes visible. Lock ordering after the fix: ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf) udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf) udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge)
At a glance
- Exploitability
- Can be exploited locally on the machine with a low-privilege account. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.
- Exploit odds
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 0.1% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: 7.8 HIGH (CVSS).
- Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 0.1% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Weakness
- CWE-667
- Record status
- Modified
Affected
- Linux Kernel < 5.10.253
- Linux Kernel < 5.15.203
- Linux Kernel < 6.1.169
- Linux Kernel < 6.6.135
- Linux Kernel < 6.12.82
- Linux Kernel < 6.18.23
- Linux Kernel < 6.19.13
- Linux Kernel 2.6.19
Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 7.8
- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-31667.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-31667. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
Fix and advisories
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1534661043c434b81cfde26b97a2fb2460329cf0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e09dfbb4f5d20ee111f92325a00f85778a5f328
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/271ee71a1917b89f6d73ec82dd091c33d92ee617
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cda78d6f8bf2b700529f2fbccb994c3e826d7c2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/546c18a14924eb521fe168d916d7ce28f1e13c1d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71a9729f412e2c692a35c542e14b706fb342927f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/974f7b138c3a96dd5cd53d1b33409cd7b2229dc6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3d6c9c053c9c605651508569230ead633b13f76
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1534661043c434b81cfde26b97a2fb2460329cf0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e09dfbb4f5d20ee111f92325a00f85778a5f328
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/271ee71a1917b89f6d73ec82dd091c33d92ee617
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cda78d6f8bf2b700529f2fbccb994c3e826d7c2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/546c18a14924eb521fe168d916d7ce28f1e13c1d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71a9729f412e2c692a35c542e14b706fb342927f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/974f7b138c3a96dd5cd53d1b33409cd7b2229dc6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3d6c9c053c9c605651508569230ead633b13f76