CVE-2026-13735
What it is
Zephyr's WireGuard implementation in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c mishandled keepalive packets. In wg_process_data_message(), any type-4 transport-data message whose payload was exactly 16 bytes (an empty plaintext plus a bare Poly1305 tag, i.e. a keepalive) was accepted and returned immediately, before wg_decrypt_packet() was ever called. The Poly1305 authentication tag was therefore never verified; the only preceding gates were a cleartext receiver-index lookup (get_peer_keypair_for_index() on the attacker-supplied data_hdr->receiver) and a non-cryptographic keypair validity/expiry check. The path is reachable entirely from the network: inbound UDP on the WireGuard port is dispatched by wg_input() to handle_transport_data() and then wg_process_data_message(). The 32-bit receiver index is transmitted in cleartext in WireGuard handshake and data messages, so an on-path observer learns it directly and an off-path attacker can brute-force it against the UDP port. Given an active receiving-valid session for that index, an attacker could send a 16-byte garbage payload and have it accepted without possessing the session key. On acceptance the unauthenticated message caused the management layer to observe a spoofed NET_EVENT_VPN_CONNECTED signal (setting peer->first_valid and notifying any net_mgmt listener) and incremented the keepalive-RX statistic. The impact is limited to integrity of this status signal: no plaintext is decrypted or injected, no key is disclosed, and the early-return path did not update the peer endpoint or liveness timers, so there is no traffic-injection, session-takeover, or availability consequence. The fix removes the pre-decrypt early return so a 16-byte payload flows through wg_decrypt_packet(), which verifies the Poly1305 tag over the empty plaintext, followed by the existing anti-replay check; only an authenticated, non-replayed message is then recognised as a keepalive. Forged keepalives now fail the tag check and are counted as decrypt failures.
At a glance
- Exploitability
- Can be exploited over the network without logging in. Limited direct impact.
- Exploit odds
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 0.3% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: 3.7 LOW (CVSS).
- Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 0.3% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Weakness
- CWE-290
- Record status
- Awaiting Analysis
Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 3.7
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2026-13735.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2026-13735. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
Fix and advisories
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/87c520a55f0f0e7cd4adf8780166e45eaad6d81c
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xxrw-r78f-f6mx