CVE-2026-13480

What it is

The LoRaWAN TS004 Fragmented Data Block Transport handler frag_transport_package_callback() in subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c parses downlink command bytes without validating that enough payload bytes remain before each access. The loop's only bound is rx_pos < len; after consuming the one-byte command id the handler cast rx_buf + rx_pos to a 10-byte struct frag_transport_setup_req, and for a DATA_FRAGMENT command passed &rx_buf[rx_pos] to the fragment decoder, which reads exactly ctx.frag_size bytes — with no remaining-length check in either case. The fragment size is attacker-chosen in a preceding FRAG_SESSION_SETUP command (ctx.frag_size = req->frag_size, capped at CONFIG_LORAWAN_FRAG_TRANSPORT_MAX_FRAG_SIZE, default 232). rx_buf aliases the 255-byte static MacCtx.RxPayload buffer in the loramac-node MAC layer, while len is the actual decrypted payload length. By padding a downlink with mismatched-index DATA_FRAGMENT filler commands (each advancing rx_pos by three bytes without producing an answer) and appending one matching-index fragment near the end of the payload, an attacker can make the decoder read up to roughly frag_size bytes past the end of RxPayload, copying adjacent static memory into the decoder buffers and the FUOTA flash image. The handler runs only on downlinks that have already passed the LoRaWAN frame MIC and FRMPayload decryption, so the defect is reachable only by a party holding the device's session keys (the FUOTA server or an attacker who has compromised those keys). The out-of-bounds bytes are never returned to the sender — the only uplink emitted is a status answer carrying fragment counts — so there is no direct disclosure channel, and on typical flat-memory LoRaWAN MCUs the over-read stays within mapped memory, making a crash unlikely. The impact is therefore a bounded out-of-bounds read with limited confidentiality consequence and no write or control-flow primitive. The fix adds remaining-length guards before each access.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited from the same network segment with an admin-level account. Limited direct impact.

Exploit odds

0.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-08-26 15:16 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-08-31 22:56 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Why it ranks here

• Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
• Exploit odds: 0.2% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
• Severity: 3.1 LOW (CVSS).
• Fix: a patch or advisory is linked.

Details

Published

2026-08-26 15:16 UTC

Last modified

2026-08-31 22:56 UTC

Exploit probability

0.2% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-20 · Improper input validation

Record status

Analyzed

Affected

• Zephyrproject Zephyr < 4.4.2

Attack profile CVSS 3.1 · 3.1

Attack vector

Adjacent network

Complexity

High

Privileges needed

High

User interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

None

Availability

Low

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