CVE-2026-102422

What it is

shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator.

At a glance

Exploitability

Can be exploited over the network without logging in. High risk of data exposure, data tampering, service disruption.

Exploit odds

0.4% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).

Fix

A patch, advisory or fixed version is referenced. Upgrade or apply it.

Timeline

1. 2026-09-29 04:17 UTC PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
2. 2026-09-30 17:32 UTC Last updatedMost recent change to the record

Details

Published

2026-09-29 04:17 UTC

Last modified

2026-09-30 17:32 UTC

Exploit probability

0.4% · EPSS, next 30 days

Weakness

CWE-78 · OS command injection

Record status

Deferred

Attack profile CVSS 4.0 · 9.2

Attack vector

Network

Complexity

Low

Attack requirements

Present

Privileges needed

None

User interaction

None

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High