CVE-2007-6755
What it is
The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain "skeleton key" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.
At a glance
- Exploitability
- Can be exploited over the network without logging in. Limited direct impact.
- Exploit odds
- 1.6% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Fix
- No patch or advisory is linked yet. Look at mitigations or restrict exposure.
Timeline
- PublishedDisclosed publicly on CVE.org and NVD
- Last updatedMost recent change to the record
Why it ranks here
- Exploited in the wild: no, CISA does not list it.
- Exploit odds: 1.6% in the next 30 days (EPSS).
- Severity: 5.8 MEDIUM (CVSS).
- Fix: none linked yet, which raises it.
Details
- Published
- Last modified
- Exploit probability
- 1.6% · EPSS, next 30 days
- Weakness
- CWE-327 · Broken cryptographic algorithm
- Record status
- Modified
Affected
- Dell Bsafe crypto-c-micro-edition ≤ 3.0.0.20
- Dell Bsafe crypto-j 5.0
- Dell Bsafe crypto-j 5.0.1
Attack profile CVSS 2.0 · 5.8
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Medium
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
Raw vector
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Is it in your code?
Hand this to your coding agent. It searches your project for the affected products and checks versions. Nothing leaves your machine.
Read https://cve-list.com/agent/cve/CVE-2007-6755.md and follow it. Check whether this project is affected by CVE-2007-6755. Read only. Don't change anything and don't upload my code. Tell me yes, no or not sure, with the file as proof.
References
- http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/
- http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html
- http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html
- http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf
- http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/
- http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657
- https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html
- http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/
- http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html
- http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html
- http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf
- http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/
- http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657
- https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html