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Tanium addressed a denial of service vulnerability in Tanium Client.

Memory safety

A buffer overread in CheckKeySyms() in X.Org X Server before 21.1.25 and XWayland before 24.1.14 could be used by authenticated X clients to leak small amounts of information from X server memory or potentially crash the X server.

Memory safety

USB Test is a lightweight Windows CLI utility for verifying sector integrity and detecting overreported capacity on USB flash drives. Prior to version 1.1.5, getSectorSize() in USB Test/src/driveinfo.cpp trusts DISK_GEOMETRY.BytesPerSector returned by IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY without checking whether the call succeeded or enforcing size bounds. USB Test/src/drivetest.cpp uses the value for division and to size a heap buffer before memcpy(buffer.data(), &sector, 8), so a physically connected malicious USB storage device can report a value below eight bytes and cause repeated out-of-bounds writes, or report zero and cause a divide-by-zero denial of service when a user starts a drive test. The heap corruption can crash the elevated application and may permit arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.5.

Memory safety

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpiolib: fix memory leak in gpiod_set_array_value_complex() on error paths A drive-by review by Sashiko reports that, after a failed call to gpiochip_set_multiple(), gpiod_set_array_value() returns abruptly, bypassing the freeing of possibly alloced bitmaps, potentially leaking memory. It is an unlikely error path, but is possible. Defer the return code check until after the bitmap_free() block.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load the icsk_ca_ops pointer.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Fix leak of uninitialized kernel data in SCLP report While report_error_write() checks that the provided buffer is at least as large as the header struct, but not that it is large enough to contain the report with the length claimed by report->length. If user-space provides a short buffer, meaning a larger report->length than the actually written payload, up to around 4K of kernel data from past the kmalloc(len + 1) sized buffer allocated in kernfs_fop_write_iter() will leak into the SCLP report. However, as the entity processing the SCLP is privileged and able to access at least the page including the report, this does not leak data that entity could not access but it is still an out of bounds read and a malformed error report that should be rejected.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data), is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl). get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0 Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140 ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40 allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31) A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation. Clamp data_start to the buffer size. Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can only be triggered by root.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card In memstick_alloc_card() and memstick_set_rw_addr(), wait_for_completion_timeout() is used to wait for device identification and address configuration requests to complete. The memstick subsystem does not provide an abort or cancellation callback in struct memstick_host for in-flight requests. If wait_for_completion_timeout() expires (for instance, when a USB transfer or command retry is delayed), memstick_alloc_card() returns an error and frees the memstick_dev structure via kfree(card). However, the host controller driver (such as rtsx_usb_ms) is still running the request asynchronously in worker context. When the transfer eventually finishes, the driver writes into host->req->data, which points to memory inside the already freed card structure. This leads to a KASAN slab-use-after-free write: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88813c188079 by task kworker/1:5/5239 Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req Call Trace: ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:450 rtsx_usb_ms_issue_cmd drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:477 [inline] rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req+0x557/0x1a00 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:531 process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396 worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3560 kthread+0x373/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436 Allocated by task 1662: memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:383 [inline] memstick_check+0x2c1/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452 process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396 Freed by task 1662: kfree+0x20c/0x650 mm/slub.c:6792 memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:420 [inline] memstick_check+0x72b/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452 process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396 Host controller drivers (rtsx_usb_ms, jmb38x_ms, tifm_ms, r592) already implement their own hardware and bus timeouts, and callers in mspro_block and ms_block already rely on wait_for_completion() unconditionally. Replace wait_for_completion_timeout() with wait_for_completion() in memstick_set_rw_addr() and memstick_alloc_card() so that the card structure is never freed while an asynchronous request is in flight.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: mtk-sd: Cancel request timeout work on remove The driver queues req_timeout while a request is active. msdc_request_done() uses cancel_delayed_work(), which does not wait for a timeout callback that has already started. The timeout callback calls mmc_request_done(), which wakes the request waiter, and then continues to use host->dev_comp and check the SDIO IRQ. During unbind, msdc_drv_remove() can return and the managed mmc_host can be freed before the callback finishes. KASAN reported use-after-free accesses in msdc_request_done() and msdc_recheck_sdio_irq() in each of three unbind tests. The same tests completed without a kernel diagnostic after this change. Call cancel_delayed_work_sync() after mmc_remove_host() has stopped new requests and before the driver releases the host resources.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sock: Serialize dead-device detachment Rebinding an HCI socket after its controller is unregistered can race monitor control replay and crash the kernel. hci_sock_bind() clears hci_pi(sk)->hdev and drops the device reference under only the socket lock, whereas send_monitor_control_replay() holds hci_sk_list.lock for reading. Replay can observe a non-NULL hdev, then bind can clear it and drop the last reference before create_monitor_ctrl_open() reads hdev->id. This can cause a NULL pointer dereference if the pointer is reloaded, or a use-after-free if the old pointer is retained. The kernel reported: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] RIP: 0010:create_monitor_ctrl_open+0x579/0x800 Call Trace: hci_sock_bind+0xd96/0x1190 __sys_bind+0x166/0x200 __x64_sys_bind+0x6d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The same missing serialization lets hci_send_to_sock() select a socket for the old device and queue its frame after bind has detached the socket or installed a new binding. Take hci_sk_list.lock for writing when clearing the device pointer and resetting the socket state. This waits for existing replay and delivery readers to finish before detachment and prevents later readers from using the old binding. Keep hci_dev_put() outside the critical section because the final device release can sleep.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner rfcomm_recv_data() hands the skb to d->data_ready() and returns 0 without freeing it, so the callback owns the skb from that point on. The tty implementation frees it when the DLC has been detached from its device: static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner; if (!dev) { kfree_skb(skb); return; } The socket implementation returns without freeing it, and the skb is leaked. A connected DLC can have no owner: rfcomm_sock_destruct() clears d->owner, while the DLC itself stays on the session until it is closed. Data frames that arrive in that window still find d->state == BT_CONNECTED in rfcomm_recv_data() and are handed to the callback, one leaked skb each. The leak does not stop on its own either. The remote runs out of credits only once RFCOMM_RX_THROTTLED is set, and for a socket the only place that sets it is rfcomm_sk_data_ready() itself, below the return. rfcomm_process_dlcs() keeps granting credits, so the remote keeps sending and the leak keeps growing. Free the skb, as the tty side does.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: check the mounts before reading their parents in pivot_root() path_pivot_root() reads the parents of new_root and of the caller's root and checks whether they are shared before it checks that either mount is in the caller's mount namespace. Only namespace_sem is held. That's fine for a mount that is in the caller's mount namespace. But new_root can be a file descriptor to a mount that has been unmounted and that only the file descriptor keeps alive. If that mount stayed attached to its parent when it was unmounted nothing pins the parent for it. The final mntput() of the parent unhooks the children under mount_lock alone and frees the parent afterwards: pivot_root() close(fd), last ref on the parent ------------ --------------------------------- ex_parent = new_mnt->mnt_parent mntput_no_expire_slowpath() __umount_mnt(new_mnt) cleanup_mnt() call_rcu() IS_MNT_SHARED(ex_parent) BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in path_pivot_root+0xf1a/0x1840 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881047382f8 by task pivot_widen/157 path_pivot_root+0xf1a/0x1840 __x64_sys_pivot_root+0x165/0x190 The same goes for the caller's root via chroot(). Both outcomes of the check end in EINVAL so nothing but the read itself goes wrong. It's the same thing commit bb4609405752 ("statmount: read the parent of an unmounted mount under mount_lock") fixed for statmount(). Check that both mounts are in the caller's namespace before their parents are read. Every path returns EINVAL either way.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/altera: Fix use-after-free in error paths In both altr_edac_a10_device_add() and altr_portb_setup(), the error path freed the dci structure before releasing the devres group. Since the managed single and double bit IRQ handlers use altdev(dci->pvt_info) as their data, an IRQ firing between freeing dci and unregistering the IRQs could dereference the freed memory. Release the devres group first so the managed IRQs are unregistered before the dci structure is freed.

Memory safety OS & kernel

A use-after-free in the gf_filter_packet_destroy function (/filter_core/filter_pck.c) of GPAC Project/MP4Box before 2.5 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted MPEG-2 file.

Memory safety

A heap use-after-free in the gf_filter_pid_send_event_downstream function (/filter_core/filter_pid.c) of GPAC Project/MP4Box before 2.5 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted MP4 file.

Memory safety

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: skip screen update for DEC alignment test on backgroup consoles [BUG] Recently, we encountered a KASAN warning as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140 Read of size 1 at addr ff1100015fd9f6a4 by task tty_fbcon_oob/1239 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1239 Comm: tty_fbcon_oob Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #100 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> ... kasan_report+0xf0/0x120 fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140 ccw_putcs+0x86c/0xa80 fbcon_putcs+0x338/0x410 do_update_region+0x21d/0x450 do_con_write+0x1e0e/0x4880 con_write+0x13/0x80 n_tty_write+0x374/0x1010 file_tty_write.isra.0+0x404/0x7a0 ... reproduce: 1) open /dev/tty0, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET, op.width = 8 and op.height = 16 (visible VC1) 2) open /dev/tty1, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET, op.width = 28 and op.height = 24 (invisible VC2) 3) echo 3 > /sys/devices/virtual/graphics/fbcon/rotate_all 4) write EShash8(esc hash8) to tty1 [CAUSE] All VCs render to the framebuffer. setfont only modifies the target VC's font without resizing the framebuffer backing buffer (par->rotated.buf); the buffer is only resized for the visible VC (fbcon_do_set_font -> ... -> vc_do_resize -> update_screen). This relies on the con_should_update() check performed before every update_region(). However, the ESC # 8 path (do_con_trol -> do_update_region) omits the con_should_update() check. After changing the font size of an invisible VC, do_update_region() fills using the new font size against a buffer that was never resized, causing an out-of-bounds access. [FIX] Only push the update when the console is visible and not blanked, add the con_should_update() check in the do_con_trol() like every other call site of do_update_region() (update_region(), invert_screen(), ...).

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: fix port tear down use-after-free Some drivers for multiport devices access port driver data from completion handlers of shared URBs submitted at attach() or first open() and stopped at disconnect() or last close(), respectively. A simple NULL check before accessing the driver data makes sure that a port state container has at least been allocated, but a completion handler can still race with port tear down. Reorder the disconnect handling so that ports are not deregistered (and their driver data freed) until after all ports have been hung up and the driver disconnect() callback has run so that all I/O has been stopped.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nitro_enclaves: fix use-after-free on SLOT_ALLOC failure When ne_create_vm_ioctl() fails the SLOT_ALLOC request after anon_inode_getfile() has succeeded, the error path calls fput(enclave_file) and then frees ne_enclave. In normal userspace context, fput() defers the final __fput() via task_work. ne_enclave_release() therefore runs after ne_enclave has already been freed and dereferences ne_enclave->slot_uid, causing a use-after-free: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ne_enclave_release. The enclave has no slot allocated and is not yet linked into the enclaves list on this error path, so ne_enclave_release() is expected to return early when slot_uid is zero. However, reading slot_uid already accesses the freed object. Clear enclave_file->private_data before fput() on the error path. ne_enclave_release() then returns immediately when private_data is NULL, leaving the ioctl error path as the sole owner of ne_enclave. This is safe because the file has not been fd_install()'d yet. Tested on an AWS EC2 m5.2xlarge with CONFIG_KASAN=y. Without the patch, the reproducer triggers a KASAN slab-use-after-free on every SLOT_ALLOC failure. With the patch, no KASAN report is produced and the SLOT_ALLOC error is still returned. Normal enclave creation and teardown are unaffected.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_core: Serialize ACL scheduling with channel deletion hci_chan_sent() selects a channel under RCU but drops the read lock before accessing chan->conn and returning the channel. The ACL and LE schedulers then use its packet queue and update its transmit counters without any protection against channel deletion. After TX selects a channel and releases RCU, a disconnect command timeout on the separate request workqueue can run hci_conn_failed() and l2cap_conn_del(). hci_chan_del() can then unlink the channel, complete synchronize_rcu(), purge its queue and free it before TX resumes. This causes use-after-free both in hci_chan_sent() and in its callers. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_chan_sent+0x892/0x9b0 Workqueue: hci0 hci_tx_work Call Trace: hci_chan_sent+0x892/0x9b0 hci_tx_work+0x5e6/0xb70 Allocated by task 91: hci_chan_create+0xe3/0x350 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x12/0xa30 l2cap_chan_connect+0x110d/0x1b60 l2cap_sock_connect+0x310/0x530 Freed by task 99: hci_chan_del+0x11f/0x170 l2cap_conn_del+0x4f1/0x800 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x88c/0xd30 hci_conn_failed+0x150/0x250 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3e3/0x800 hci_cmd_sync_run+0x7e/0xc0 hci_abort_conn+0x105/0x1f0 disconnect_sync+0x157/0x290 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290 Hold the existing device mutex across channel selection and transmission in both schedulers to serialize them with channel teardown. Keep timeout handling outside the critical sections because hci_link_tx_to() acquires the same mutex. This also permits the transmit path to sleep, unlike extending the RCU read-side critical section across packet submission.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: squashfs: Add dictionary size range check to prevent shift-out-of-bounds When an abnormal SquashFS image (COMP_OPTS flag is 1 but dictionary size is 0) is mounted, and performs shift operations using dictionarysize, the shift exponent is -1, causing a shift-out-of-bounds. Detail as below: squashfs_comp_opts(msblk, buffer, length) squashfs_xz_comp_opts() if (comp_opts) n = ffs(opts->dict_size) - 1;<----opts->dict_size=0, n=-1 if (opts->dict_size != (1 << n) && opts->dict_size != (1 << n) + (1 << (n + 1))) <----shift-out-of-bounds Fix it by adding a dictionary size range check before the shift operation.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/clk: fix list cursor use after loop in nvkm_clk_ustate_update If list_for_each_entry() exits without hitting a break then "pstate" is not a valid pstate pointer. Introduce a "found" variable instead. The check is reachable from userspace: nvkm_clk_ustate_update() takes the pstate id straight from the 'pstate' debugfs file, so requesting an id that is not in clk->states - or any id at all when the perf tables are broken and the list is empty - makes the pstate->pstate != req test dereference the list head cast to a struct nvkm_pstate, which is an out-of-bounds read. [Francesco: rebased on drm-misc-next, expanded the commit message]

Memory safety OS & kernel

librtmp in RTMPDump through 2.6 contains an out-of-bounds read and heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability because AMF3_Decode ignores AMF3 property decode failures. Malicious RTMP servers or man-in-the-middle attackers can send oversized AMF3 string lengths, and with the token option DecodeTEA corrupts heap memory and leaks heap bytes.

Memory safety

P-Net before 1.0.3 passes the application alarm callback a data length derived from the variable part length field of a received RTA alarm frame without checking it against the length of the received frame. A short frame can make the callback receive a length of up to 65507 bytes. An application that copies the reported number of bytes reads past the end of the receive buffer. The attacker must have established an Application Relationship and requires ADJACENT network access. Applications that do not use the alarm data are not affected.

Memory safety

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: free the userptr ranges when a CS fails after parser_bos amdgpu_cs_parser_bos() allocates an HMM range for every userptr entry of the BO list and looks up the user pages. Those ranges are only freed when amdgpu_cs_parser_bos() itself fails or when amdgpu_cs_submit() checks them under the notifier lock. If amdgpu_cs_patch_jobs(), amdgpu_cs_vm_handling(), amdgpu_cs_sync_rings() or the early part of amdgpu_cs_submit() fails, nothing frees them: neither amdgpu_cs_parser_fini() nor amdgpu_bo_list_free() touch e->range. Each such CS then leaks the range, its hmm_pfns array (8 bytes per page of the userptr BO) and the BO reference the range holds. An IB on a ring that patches the CS in place (e.g. VCN) with an unmapped va_start fails in amdgpu_cs_patch_ibs() and takes this path. Free the ranges on those error paths. Ranges amdgpu_cs_submit() already dropped are NULL, so freeing them again is a no-op. (cherry picked from commit c52a9542ed7cfd527feb938bd0accada2ac8d267)

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vc_screen: reload vc pointer before if (ret) in vcs_write() to avoid UAF The reload of 'vc' added by commit 8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF") sits after the 'if (ret)' block, so the copy-failure break path exits the loop without reloading vc. If the vc was kfree()'d via vc_port_destruct during the unlocked copy_from_user() window, the post-loop 'if (written && vc) vcs_scr_updated(vc)' is reached with a stale non-NULL vc. The '&& vc' guard from commit a287620312dc ("vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write") only handles the NULL case, not this stale-non-NULL case; vcs_notifier() then reads param->vc->vc_num from freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff888007149190 Call Trace: vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa0 vcs_scr_updated+0x77/0xa0 vcs_write+0x71b/0x7e0 Allocated by task: vc_allocate -> con_install -> tty_open Freed by task: kfree <- vt_ioctl (VT_DISALLOCATE -> vc_port_destruct) Move the reload to immediately after console_lock(), before 'if (ret)', so every break path below passes a fresh vc to the post-loop vcs_scr_updated().

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: line6: reject oversized playback packets Each playback URB is handed a slice of out.buffer that is exactly LINE6_ISO_PACKETS * max_packet_size_out bytes, sized from the OUT endpoint, but the number of bytes written into that slice is never compared against it. submit_audio_out_urb() takes the frame count from prev_fsize, which audio_in_callback() derived from the *IN* endpoint's received packet length, and rescales it with the playback frame size; when prev_fsize is still zero it synthesizes a length from the sample rate instead. On a device declaring a large IN wMaxPacketSize and a small OUT wMaxPacketSize, the resulting memcpy(), or the memset() when the playback stream is idle, runs past its slice and, as the reproducer below shows, beyond the allocation. usb_submit_urb() is not a backstop. max_packet_size_out comes from usb_maxpacket(), which returns only the low 11 bits of wMaxPacketSize, while USB core validates a high-speed isochronous length against that base scaled by usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(). A length of up to three times the allocated slice is therefore accepted, and even a rejected URB is only rejected after the write. Reject a packet that does not fit the slice the driver allocated for it. Clamping it instead would silently shorten the capture-derived rate feedback and desynchronize the two streams. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229) Write of size 1024 at addr ffff888100bbd400 by task kworker/1:2/5002 Workqueue: events line6_startup_work Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229) line6_submit_audio_out_all_urbs (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:291) line6_stream_start (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:194) line6_pcm_acquire (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:337) line6_startup_work (sound/usb/line6/driver.c:728) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100bbd400 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 256-byte region [ffff888100bbd400, ffff888100bbd500)

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: aspeed-vhub: cancel wake work on device removal wake_work is armed from the gadget .wakeup callback to resume suspended downstream ports, and it is never cancelled in ast_vhub_remove(), so a work item queued before or during removal can run after devm has freed vhub and its ports, a use-after-free. Cancelling the work alone is not sufficient: usb_gadget_wakeup() takes no lock and the unbind path never clears wakeup_en, so a remote-wakeup request in flight on another CPU can re-arm the work after the cancel and before vhub is freed. ast_vhub_del_dev() already clears d->registered under vhub->lock before unregistering the gadget. Refuse the wakeup in ast_vhub_udc_wakeup() once d->registered is clear: the check and the schedule_work() are then atomic against the unbind, so a wakeup that passed before the flag was cleared is drained by the cancel_work_sync() after the del_dev loop, and one that arrives later returns without arming. Also move INIT_WORK() to the top of ast_vhub_probe(), since the probe error path reuses ast_vhub_remove() and would otherwise cancel a never-initialized work item. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmd generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: vcc: hold port lock when clearing tty pointer in vcc_cleanup vcc_cleanup() sets port->tty to NULL without holding port->lock, racing with vcc_event() LDC callbacks that read port->tty under port->lock and then use tty->port. This can cause a use-after-free when the callback dereferences tty->port after cleanup has already destroyed and freed it.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: cdns3: fix use-after-free in cdns3_gadget_exit() cdns3_gadget_start() arms two works on system_freezable_wq: pending_status_wq for the deferred ep0 status stage and aligned_buf_wq for realigned request buffers. Both handlers use the cdns3_device the works are embedded in, and cdns3_pending_setup_status_handler() also calls the ep0 request completion. cdns3_gadget_exit() does not wait for these works. It frees all endpoints and aligned buffers and drops the last reference to the gadget device, which frees priv_dev, so a work queued before the exit can run after the free. Fix this by waiting for both works after the gadget driver is unbound and the IRQ is freed, when no new work can be queued, and before the endpoints and buffers are released. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Fix initial port reference race For RFCOMM_RELEASE_ONHUP devices, rfcomm_tty_install() and __rfcomm_release_dev() both use RFCOMM_TTY_OWNED to decide who drops the initial tty_port reference. The release path tests the bit separately from the install path setting it, so both can drop that reference. The synchronous hangup does not prevent this race: port->tty is not assigned until tty_port_open(), after installation. The following interleaving is possible: 1. Install and release each obtain a reference with rfcomm_dev_get(). 2. Release observes RFCOMM_TTY_OWNED clear. 3. Install sets RFCOMM_TTY_OWNED and drops the initial reference. 4. Release drops the same initial reference again. 5. TTY cleanup drops its reference and frees the device. 6. Release performs its final tty_port_put() on the freed port. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tty_port_put+0x22/0x190 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881001d3d5c by task poc/92 Call Trace: tty_port_put+0x22/0x190 rfcomm_dev_ioctl+0x1d4/0x1930 sock_do_ioctl+0x110/0x260 sock_ioctl+0x380/0x590 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x1c0 Allocated by task 88: rfcomm_dev_ioctl+0x8f6/0x1930 sock_do_ioctl+0x110/0x260 sock_ioctl+0x380/0x590 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x1c0 Freed by task 65: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 rfcomm_dev_destruct+0x23b/0x2f0 release_one_tty+0xc1/0x370 process_one_work+0x661/0x1090 Use test_and_set_bit() in both paths so that only the caller that changes RFCOMM_TTY_OWNED from clear to set drops the initial reference. Each path keeps its own lookup reference until release or TTY cleanup, preserving the existing callback ordering and error handling.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: ua101: reject mismatched capture/playback packet sizes detect_usb_format() cross-checks bSubframeSize, bBitResolution and tSamFreq between the capture and playback interfaces, but never relates the two endpoints' wMaxPacketSize and bNrChannels. Each playback URB gets a buffer of ua->playback.max_packet_bytes, while the number of bytes written into it is derived from the capture stream: capture_urb_complete() computes frames from the received capture packet and capture.frame_bytes, and start_usb_playback() and playback_work() multiply that by playback.frame_bytes. A device declaring a large capture wMaxPacketSize with few capture channels and a small playback wMaxPacketSize with many playback channels therefore memset()s and memcpy()s past the end of the playback buffer, in open() of the PCM node the driver registers during probe. usb_submit_urb() rejects the over-long iso_frame_desc[0].length with -EMSGSIZE, but only after the write. Reject such descriptors at probe time. Genuine UA-101/UA-1000 hardware declares proportional packet sizes and is unaffected. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in start_usb_playback (sound/usb/misc/ua101.c:586) Write of size 2048 at addr ffff8881098f3c00 by task exploit/5021 Call Trace: __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84) start_usb_playback (sound/usb/misc/ua101.c:586) playback_pcm_open (sound/usb/misc/ua101.c:679) snd_pcm_open_substream (sound/core/pcm_native.c:2829) snd_pcm_open (sound/core/pcm_native.c:2865 sound/core/pcm_native.c:2932) snd_pcm_playback_open (sound/core/pcm_native.c:2891) snd_open (sound/core/sound.c:166) chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:411) do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:996) vfs_open (fs/open.c:1101) path_openat (fs/namei.c:4837 fs/namei.c:5000) do_file_open (fs/namei.c:5029) do_sys_openat2 (fs/open.c:1417) __x64_sys_openat (fs/open.c:1423 fs/open.c:1439 fs/open.c:1434) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881098f3c00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 168-byte region [ffff8881098f3c00, ffff8881098f3ca8)

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel: fix buffer over-read in btintel_hw_error() The "Exception info %s" print uses skb->data + 1, but the 12-byte payload is not guaranteed to be NUL-terminated and can be read past its end. Bound the print with "%.*s" and skb->len - 1.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlegacy: 3945: free EEPROM data on remove il3945_pci_probe() calls il_eeprom_init(), which allocates memory for the EEPROM data. The probe failure paths release this allocation with il_eeprom_free(), but the remove path does not free it after a successful probe. As a result, the EEPROM data is leaked when the PCI device is removed. Free the EEPROM data in il3945_pci_remove() before releasing the mac80211 hardware structure. This issue was found by manual code inspection.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment (align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap data per TX frame. The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading. Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed. This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion, in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths of cw1200_tx(). Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: fix driver deregistration order USB serial driver modules register one driver for the USB bus and one or more drivers for the ports on the USB serial bus. When unloading a driver module, the USB driver must be deregistered before the USB serial bus drivers so that I/O is stopped before unbinding the ports to avoid use-after-free in completion handlers accessing port data. Note that the "new_id" attributes must first be removed to prevent new ids from being added and triggering a probe of the USB driver after it has been deregistered.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: keep fallback association elements alive Associating to a non-transmitted MBSSID profile reads freed memory while determining the operating channel and applying HT capabilities. When an association response omits WMM, HT, or VHT information, ieee80211_assoc_config_link() parses the cached BSS IEs and copies the missing element pointers out of that fallback parse. For a non-transmitted MBSSID profile those pointers refer to merged-profile storage owned by the parse object, and the fallback block frees that object at its end. The copied pointers are used afterwards to determine the operating channel, configure bandwidth, and apply HT capabilities. Keep the fallback parse result alive until association setup finishes. [reorder variable declaration]

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses tb_xdp_properties_request() allocates room for 45 data dwords in its 252-byte response buffer. The XDomain length field is six bits wide, however, and a malicious peer can set it to 63. After the fixed response fields are subtracted, the driver treats this as 48 data dwords. Commit 322e93448d90 ("thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size") only bounds the copy against data_len. If data_len is at least 48, memcpy() reads 192 bytes from the 180-byte res->data array, causing a 12-byte heap out-of-bounds read. Commit 4db2bd2ed478 ("thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size") limits the earlier copy but does not constrain this header-derived length. Reject response data lengths that exceed the allocated source buffer before copying them into the assembled property block.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Fix KASAN reported use-after-free when request is canceled Alan reported that when doing stress testing sometimes KASAN notices use-after-free during control channel operation (stripped down keeping the relevant parts): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tb_cfg_request_sync+0x240/0x250 [thunderbolt] Read of size 24 at addr ffff88811067f290 by task kworker/u40:2/1760 <TASK> tb_cfg_request_sync+0x240/0x250 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_read_raw+0x367/0x510 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_read+0xec/0x240 [thunderbolt] tb_port_get_link_generation+0x258/0x420 [thunderbolt] tb_usb3_consumed_bandwidth+0x1c1/0x2c0 [thunderbolt] tb_tunnel_consumed_bandwidth+0xfd/0x910 [thunderbolt] tb_available_bandwidth+0x5f2/0xeb0 [thunderbolt] tb_recalc_estimated_bandwidth+0x2a0/0x1bc0 [thunderbolt] tb_handle_dp_bandwidth_request+0x1897/0x5e20 [thunderbolt] process_one_work+0x675/0x1230 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xf70 kthread+0x365/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x54d/0x710 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1760: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1ee/0x550 tb_cfg_read_raw+0x1d3/0x510 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_read+0xec/0x240 [thunderbolt] tb_port_get_link_generation+0x258/0x420 [thunderbolt] tb_usb3_consumed_bandwidth+0x1c1/0x2c0 [thunderbolt] tb_tunnel_consumed_bandwidth+0xfd/0x910 [thunderbolt] tb_available_bandwidth+0x5f2/0xeb0 [thunderbolt] tb_recalc_estimated_bandwidth+0x2a0/0x1bc0 [thunderbolt] tb_handle_dp_bandwidth_request+0x1897/0x5e20 [thunderbolt] process_one_work+0x675/0x1230 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xf70 kthread+0x365/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x54d/0x710 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 926: kfree+0x18f/0x4a0 tb_cfg_request_put+0xb7/0xe0 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_request_work+0x82/0x120 [thunderbolt] process_one_work+0x675/0x1230 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xf70 kthread+0x365/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x54d/0x710 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Second to last potentially related work creation: __queue_work+0x575/0xd00 queue_work_on+0x77/0x80 tb_cfg_request_cancel+0xc7/0x260 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_request_sync+0x1f6/0x250 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_read_raw+0x367/0x510 [thunderbolt] tb_cfg_read+0xec/0x240 [thunderbolt] tb_port_get_link_generation+0x258/0x420 [thunderbolt] tb_usb3_consumed_bandwidth+0x1c1/0x2c0 [thunderbolt] tb_tunnel_consumed_bandwidth+0xfd/0x910 [thunderbolt] tb_available_bandwidth+0x5f2/0xeb0 [thunderbolt] tb_recalc_estimated_bandwidth+0x2a0/0x1bc0 [thunderbolt] tb_handle_dp_bandwidth_request+0x1897/0x5e20 [thunderbolt] process_one_work+0x675/0x1230 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xf70 kthread+0x365/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x54d/0x710 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The last stack trace is helpful because it shows that we are cancelling a request and looking at tb_cfg_request_cancel() what might happen is that tb_cfg_request_work() completes right before tb_cfg_request_cancel() starts and because of this it will call schedule_work() queueing the same work to run again. However, it is already removed from the request_queue and reference count is dropped so when tb_cfg_request_work() triggers again it will access memory that is already released. Fix this so that we first make sure a cancelled request is not handed away from tb_cfg_request_find() or scheduled to run. Then instead of relying on the worker to clean up the request we will do it in tb_cfg_request_cancel() after the work is canceled from running. Make tb_cfg_request_dequeue() release the request only if it was actually removed from the queue.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: gp2ap020a00f: drain irq_work after free_irq The threaded IRQ handler queues data->work through irq_work_queue() so the trigger is polled from a per-CPU context. free_irq() does not flush an irq_work the handler already queued, so after gp2ap020a00f_remove() returns that work may still run and call iio_trigger_poll() on data->trig, which the devm cleanup has already freed, causing a use-after-free. Add irq_work_sync(&data->work) after free_irq() in remove() and in the probe error path, mirroring commit 78601726d4a5 ("iio: trigger: sysfs: fix use-after-free on remove"). Found by an in-house static analysis tool, confirmed by manual review.

Memory safety OS & kernel

FreeRDP before 3.32.0 contains a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in persistent_cache_read_entry_v2 that allows local attackers to corrupt heap memory via integer wraparound in bitmap size calculation. Attackers can craft a persistent cache v2 file with oversized width and height values that causes mismatched entry size accounting and fixed 16 KiB reads, leading to crashes or code execution when loaded.

Memory safety Freerdp

OW2 ASM 3.0 before 9.11 contains a quadratic memory allocation vulnerability in MethodWriter.computeMaxStackAndLocal() and computeAllFrames() when using COMPUTE_MAXS or COMPUTE_FRAMES. Attackers can supply a crafted class file with thousands of overlapping exception handlers, causing excessive Edge allocations and an OutOfMemoryError that crashes the JVM.

Memory safety Browser & mail

An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.2 and iPadOS 26.7.2, iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2, tvOS 27.2, visionOS 27.2, watchOS 27.2. Processing a maliciously crafted font may result in the disclosure of process memory.

Memory safety OS & kernel Apple Ipados

A flaw was found in GIMP. The PSD thumbnail resource loader performs a BGR-to-RGB channel swap with a fixed 3-byte stride and does not verify that the JPEG thumbnail is RGB. A crafted grayscale PSD thumbnail can cause a heap out-of-bounds read and write in the plug-in process, leading to a crash and potentially arbitrary code execution when the victim browses or opens the file.

Memory safety

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix slab-out-of-bounds when handling team device events The mlx5_handle_changeupper_event() and mlx5_handle_changeinfodata_event() functions check for LAG masters (which includes both bonding and team devices) but only call bonding-specific APIs. When processing team device events, calling bond_slave_get_rcu() and bond_is_slave_inactive() on team_port structures causes KASAN to detect an out-of-bounds memory access since team_port is smaller than bond slave. Fix this by wrapping the bond-specific API calls with a check for bonding devices. This allows the function to still process LAG events for both bonding and teams but only calls bond-specific functions when dealing with actual bonding devices. For mlx5_handle_changeinfodata_event(), keep the explicit bond check as mlx5 doesn't handle state information for team ports anyway. Tested with Mellanox ConnectX-5 on Linux 7.2.0-rc6: - Bonding: PASS (no regressions) - Team device: PASS (no KASAN errors)

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Fix shift-out-of-bounds for aggregated ALH capture When ch_count is smaller than blob->alh_cfg.device_count (e.g. a mono capture stream, such as a SmartMic, aggregated across multiple SDW links), step = ch_count / blob->alh_cfg.device_count truncates to 0. The subsequent GENMASK(step - 1, 0) then underflows step - 1 (u32) to UINT_MAX, causing GENMASK()'s internal shift to use an out-of-bounds exponent: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c:2363:13 shift exponent 18446744069414584384 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' Treat ch_count < device_count the same way as the existing "channels equal to output reference channels" case: apply the same ch_mask to every aggregated device instead of trying to split channels that can't be evenly divided.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: free the sbi after a grace period If the "nocase" mount option ntfs3 uses custom hash and dentry compare functions. Both access ntfs3 superblock private information in rcu pathwalk. ntfs_put_super() and ntfs3_kill_sb() drop the info without any rcu delay. A lookup that's still inside the filesystem when the last reference to the mount is dropped causes a UAF. With a pathwalk held up in ntfs_d_hash() while the last reference to the mount goes away: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010453c850 by task walker/99 Call Trace: <TASK> ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940 ntfs_d_hash+0x22b/0x500 link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30 path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00 filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0 vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0 [...] Allocated by task 95: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560 ntfs_init_fs_context+0x2db/0x5a0 alloc_fs_context+0x52e/0xc70 [...] Freed by task 98: kfree+0x1db/0x5b0 deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0 cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130 task_work_run+0x131/0x250 The bug is currently masked by the grace period in namespace_unlock() for umount(2). Keep the necessary information until the filesystem private info is freed and free it with an rcu delay. ntfs3_free_sbi() now runs from an rcu callback and drops the upcase table via ntfs_put_shared(). So switch s_shared_lock over to spin_lock_bh(). Otherwise the callback can deadlock against a task holding the lock on the same cpu.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies bsg-lib allocates a 96-byte (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) reply buffer per job, but struct ufs_rpmb_reply is 104 bytes: a 40-byte struct ufs_bsg_reply followed by a 64-byte EHS. When an Advanced RPMB command returns an EHS, ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() copies it right after the 40-byte header and writes 8 bytes past the end of the buffer. Let each BSG transport pass its reply buffer size to bsg_setup_queue() and have ufs_bsg request sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply), so the full reply reaches user space. Other transports keep SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Cope with the SS bit being set in #NPF exit codes When running Hyper-V from Windows 11, KVM is seeing the SS bit set in nested page fault error codes produced for shadowed NPT. The AMD manual is unclear about when SS is set, including whether it can be set when SupervisorShadowStackEn (bit 6) is not set in the MISC_CTL field of the VMCB. Nevertheless, the unexpected SS bit causes out of bounds accesses in permission_fault(), seen as either WARNs or UBSAN reports: kernel: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:225:27 kernel: index 34 is out of range for type 'u16 [16]' (in this case, the page fault error code is 34*2=0x44, i.e. SS|U; the report shows SS|U|W happening as well). Fix the handling of unknown error codes by dropping SS and (with a WARN) any bits not among those that permission_fault() expects to receive. At the same time, given the uncertainty about when hardware sets SS, follow the processor's behavior when constructing the fault's error code, and preserve the SS bit as passed to FNAME(walk_addr_generic). While the behavior is surprising, there's a possibility that Hyper-V expects it (Hyper-V does not even enable CET unless it finds MBEC/GMET!), so retain the information when reflecting the fault to L1 instead of unconditionally discarding it. Bisection shows that this started happening with commit 687ee95c1b6d ("KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests"), even though SHSTK was available to guests since Linux 6.18. However, this is not because bit 1 of MISC_CTL (GMET) somehow enables reporting the SS bit; rather, it's simply that Hyper-V never uses CET unless GMET is also present. The WARN is reproducible even with gmet=0, with some hacking of kvm-unit-tests's cet.c testcase to ensure that the first access to the shadow stack triggers a page fault.

Memory safety OS & kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: free iov when btrfs_uring_read_extent() fails After btrfs_uring_read_extent(), the caller always jumped to out_acct. That skips kfree(data->iov), which is only correct for -EIOCBQUEUED where the deferred path owns the iov. On failure, fall through to out_free instead.

Memory safety OS & kernel