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Improper neutralization of special elements used in a command ('command injection') in Windows Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network.

exploited Injection Browser & mail Microsoft Outlook Web

Roundcube Webmail before 1.6.20 and 1.7.x before 1.7.5 are affected by IMAP command injection. A remote authenticated attacker can exploit this via CRLF sequences injected into the _uid parameter of the mail/headers and mail/viewsource actions to execute arbitrary IMAP commands.

Injection Browser & mail

Roundcube Webmail before 1.6.20 and 1.7.x before 1.7.5 is affected by an IMAP command injection vulnerability. A remote authenticated attacker can exploit this via CRLF sequences injected into the _flag parameter of the mail/mark action to execute arbitrary IMAP commands. Upstream fixed this in the commit “Fix IMAP command injection via CRLF in `_flag` parameter of mail/mark action”, which rejects flags containing control, whitespace and IMAP-special characters.

Injection Browser & mail Roundcube Webmail

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. From 17.0.0 until 21.0.4, packages/happy-dom/src/module/ECMAScriptModuleCompiler.ts accepts a named ESM import alias without validating that it is a JavaScript binding identifier before inserting it into a generated destructuring binding. With enableJavaScriptEvaluation enabled, attacker-controlled HTML or module source can use an invalid alias that becomes a valid default initializer after compilation, causing the generated JavaScript to execute in the Node.js host process. The demonstrated reachable path uses a JSON module import attribute, which prevents the malicious alias from being emitted again in a later ESM circular-import assignment and keeps the generated function syntactically valid. This incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33943 is a distinct residual path because the earlier remediation validated the local export importName path but not the named-import alias. This issue is fixed in version 21.0.4.

Injection Browser & mail

Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it. Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction. The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.

Injection Browser & mail